Toward the Identification and Refinement of a Behavioral Indicator of Identity Coherence by Benson, Kathryn Taylor
  
 
 
TOWARD THE INDENTIFICATION AND REFINEMENT OF A BEHAVIORAL 
INDICATOR OF IDENTITY COHERENCE 
 
A Thesis 
by 
KATHRYN TAYLOR BENSON  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
Chair of Committee,  Heather Lench 
Committee Members, Steve Balsis 
 Jeff Liew 
Head of Department, Heather Lench 
 
August 2017 
 
Major Subject: Psychology 
 
Copyright 2017 Kathryn Taylor Benson
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a devastating mental illness, occurring at a 
rate of 1-5% within the general community and 15-20% of those already seeking treatment 
(i.e., clinical samples). A complex disorder, BPD is described as a kind of pervasive 
dysregulation, manifest as instability of affect, behavior, cognition, and identity. The 
dysregulated identity component includes a broad array of indicators but centrally regards a 
poorly developed self-schema—a conceptual frame of reference lacking sufficient structural 
integrity to support the consistent and independent experience of one’s self.  Historically, 
BPD has been considered difficult to diagnose, and current forms of assessment rely 
exclusively on variants of self report. Such procedures are problematic insofar as the 
underlying construct—problematic identity— suggests inherent difficulties in first-person 
accounts. Despite the variety of experimental indicators targeting dysregulation of affect and 
behavior, as well as interpersonal functioning (e.g, Ekman facial emotion recognition task, 
interpersonal trust tasks, monetary delay tasks and go/no-go tasks), to date, no experimental 
indicator for the dysregulated identity component has been identified. Broadly, the current 
project aimed to establish and refine a behavioral indicator of the coherence of personality 
structure, utilizing a cognitive paradigm that taps the self-system—the Self-Reference Effect 
(SRE). While the SRE is listed in RDoC material for its potential utility as a paradigm for the 
measure of self-perception as a social process, at this point there are limited data to suggest 
how it might be useful.  Given the 40 years of results indicating that the self can serve an 
active and powerful role in processing personal data, the current investigation piloted the 
potential utility of the Self-Referent Effect in identifying identity dysregulation.  
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Problematical Identity was measured by the identity subscale of the Borderline Features 
Scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI).  Two cut points were made along this 
dimensional indicator, identifying a normative group, an elevated group—considered 
informative of borderline personality symptomatology, and an exploratory group—self-
reporting as markedly low on problematical identity functioning. Word recall and response 
time were investigated across the three groups and preliminary findings suggested a pattern 
of enhanced performance for the normative identity group, who appeared to demonstrate a 
stronger mnemonic effect from the use of their self as an encoding strategy, relative to the 
two groups self-reporting indicators of problematical functioning. For the two problematical 
identity functioning groups, the use of the self does not appear to be as effective of a 
mnemonic device. These initial results provided support for the use of this task and suggest 
following up on the design is likely warranted. 
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INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EXAMINATION 
 
As a symptom of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), dysregulated identity can 
be characterized as a poorly developed self-schema—a conceptual frame of reference 
lacking sufficient structural integrity to support the consistent and independent experience of 
one’s self as distinct from others, a sense of self which lacks coherence across both time and 
place (e.g., see Jorgensen, 2006)—where coherence refers to “the quality of forming a 
unified whole” (Webster’s Dictionary, 1959, p. 520). As a symptom of BPD, dysregulated 
identity has been associated with overall higher levels of psychiatric symptoms, including 
elevated anxiety, anger, and depression scores, as well as increased concurrent personality 
disorder diagnosis (e.g., see Sollberger, 2011). More broadly, recent meta-analytic data 
suggest that individuals diagnosed with BPD have a 10 year suicide rate 50% above national 
averages (i.e., roughly 10% of those who meet criteria will complete suicide within the next 
10 years) (Pompili, Girardi, Ruberto, & Tatarelli, 2005). Given the base rates to which these 
findings apply—1-5% within the general community and 15-20% of those already seeking 
treatment (i.e., clinical samples)—attempts to reduce barriers to treatment, and increase 
clinical prowess aimed at detection and intervention, are warranted. However, despite the 
variety of experimental indicators relevant to BPD (i.e.,  behavioral / performance-based 
indicators), targeting dysregulation of affect and behavior, as well as interpersonal 
functioning (e.g, Ekman facial emotion recognition task, interpersonal trust tasks, monetary 
delay tasks and go/no-go tasks), there has been little progress in developing a comparable 
performance-based paradigm with which to study structural identity deficits.  
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 To date, no experimental indicator has been identified for the dysregulated identity 
component, with current forms of assessment relying exclusively on variants of self and 
other-based reports and/or interview methodologies.  Such procedures are problematic 
insofar as the underlying construct being assessed—problematic identity—suggests inherent 
difficulties in first-person generated accounts.   The goal of the current project is to develop 
and refine a performance-based paradigm to assess identity coherence by relating self-
referent memory performance to self-report markers of BPD features of identity disturbance. 
Toward that end, the Self-Reference Effect (SRE) (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977) is 
an empirically-derived, highly replicated cluster of related findings which may have promise 
as an aid to examine the structure of the self. While the SRE is listed in RDoC material for 
its potential utility as a paradigm for the measure of self-perception as a social process, at 
this point there are limited data to suggest how it might be useful. Based on 40 years of 
results (for a meta-analytic review, see Symons & Johnson, 1997)indicating that the self can 
serve as an active and powerful role in processing personal data (for a meta-analytic review, 
see Symons & Johnson, 1997), and going beyond previous examinations of the content of 
the self within groups conceptualized as manifesting problems in identity (details to follow, 
see background on the SRE), the focus of the current line of inquiry was to examine whether 
individual differences in putative self-concept coherence can be reliably associated with 
differences in incidental recall, within a self-referent/semantic comparison design.  If indeed 
there is a reduced self-referent effect for people with BPD symptoms, this supports the 
contention that the structural organization hypothesized to provide the depth of processing 
benefit identifiable for most individuals is less well-developed or articulated. 
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Toward the goal of developing and refining a performance-based paradigm capable 
of informing on identity coherence, first, a review is presented on the constructs Self and 
Identity. Emphasized are the philosophical/theoretical considerations provided by William 
James and the theoretical/ developmental/clinical considerations of Erickson, also touching 
on Kernberg and associated theorists, as well as attachment theorists. 
Next, given the DSM ideally represents any consensus within the field on construct 
instantiation, a detailed review is presented of the DSM’s management of the Self and 
Identity constructs, beginning however in DSM-III (1980) with the introduction of 
borderline personality disorder. Also reviewed are empirical examinations of the Self and 
Identity Constructs as they relate to borderline personality/BPD. 
Emphasized throughout are several distinctions; namely, the distinction between the 
constructs Self and Identity, the distinction between Identity structure and Identity content, 
and the distinction between borderline personality (as a structural deficit with associated 
organizational, i.e., content, issues), and borderline personality disorder (a diagnostic entity). 
Next, a transition to a review of the Self-Reference Effect, both theoretical 
considerations as well as previous empirical examinations, emphasizing the strength of the 
effect as a whole, methodological considerations related to distinguishing Identity structure 
from Identity content, as well as the SRE’s previously demonstrated ability to distinguish 
Identity structure from Identity content. With the overarching goal to take what is known 
about the Self-Reference Effect and to refine a paradigm capable of maximally 
differentiating normative from problematical identity, it was necessary to identify a design 
with a history of detecting self-referent effects.  An overview is presented of the design 
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characteristics which were reviewed, which is only a selection from a detailed review which 
was performed of the cross-literature models for the family of findings collectively referred 
to as the SRE, which focused on patterns in effect-size estimates for significant between and 
within-class mediators and moderators.  Following selection of the design characteristics, the 
aims of the project are iterated, and hypotheses made. 
The Method reviews the methodology of the current pilot; the procedures employed; 
the statistical formation of groups, and the handling of data.  The Results presents findings, 
interpretation of which is facilitated by effect sizes, and the Discussion summarizes the 
findings, highlighting considerations of limitation and directions forward. 
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ON THE CONSTRUCTS SELF AND IDENTITY 
William James on Self and Identity 
Attempts to delineate the essential features of “the self,” as a construct, have a 
complex history, and to date, both the parts and whole have remained under investigation 
(Jorgensen, 2006).  In psychology, discussion surrounding the Self, and a related construct, 
Identity, are frequently traced to William James, who presents a notion of the self as both 
the I as well as the Me.  From Psychology: A Briefer Course, James states at the outset: 
“Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of 
myself, of my personal existence.  At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total 
self of me, being as it were…, partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly 
subject…we may call one the Me and the other the I.” 
Of the many possible Me-Self’s to which James refers, all can be considered together in the 
unity of feeling they arouse; namely, the sense of sameness or of ownership1, or of warmth; 
as in the warmth which arises in one’s heart when in the presence of someone loved, or 
even in the presence of the memory of someone loved. 
In contrast to the Me-Self, James acknowledges that the I-Self is “is a much more 
difficult subject of inquiry” (p. 191), but forges on, stating “[the I-Self] is that which at any 
given moment is conscious, whereas the Me is only one of the things which [the I] 
 
 
1 Regarding the distinction between same and ownership, James suggests it is difficult to draw a hard line 
“between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine” (James, 1890; p. 174).
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is conscious of.  In other words, [the I] is the Thinker” (p. 191). For James, the saliency of 
the I’s function, as a thinker, regards Identity, where in its purest form, identity regards 
some perception or determination of sameness—a thought-action (i.e., determination) 
carried out despite variation in appearance, or perhaps, the appearance of variation. 
Moreover, James describes personal identity as “the sense of sameness perceived by 
thought and predicated of things thought about. These things are a present self and a self of 
yesterday. The thought not only thinks them both, but thinks that they are identical” (p. 
214).  In other words, personal identity is the cause of as well as the result of the function 
of the I holding together as one all the seemingly disparate Me- Selves that are possible 
objects of the I as thinker.  What’s more is that this includes the I as a Me, and the I does 
this—maintains a continuity amongst the Me’s—despite the dissimilarity and discontinuity 
of those Me’s 
For James, it is this feeling of warmth, present to you as an I, when reflecting on 
you as a Me, which underlies the sense of continuousness for consciousness in reflecting 
on its own self; or more simply, this feeling of warmth and ownership is what underlies our 
sense of self.  James suggests the relevance of warmth for personal identity is immediately 
apparent, for when that warmth is lost, “accordingly, we find that, where the resemblance 
and the continuity are no longer felt,” as, James’ suggests is the case with disorders 
affecting the memory, “the sense of personal identity goes too” (p. 216). Or, James invites 
the reader to think of the stories you have been told, about you, as a child, but which you 
do not yourself remember. While you may “know yourself” as the owner of those 
behaviors, deeds, affects—yet because you do not remember yourself 
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being the actor of the story, because you cannot “feel yourself” in the story—there is no 
warmth. James suggests that these stories are only about you; that they are not a part of you 
in the same way, and you can feel this difference. 
Continued Relevance of James’ Distinction: Self, Parts of Self, and Identity 
The I-Self/Me-Self distinction drawn out by James is a pivotal one—for the socio-
cognitive sciences, with their use of self-concepts and schemas; for clinical and 
developmental psychology, with their use of mental representations, working models, and 
object-relations; and relatedly, for psychoanalysis, with their use of, e.g., transference-
focused psychotherapy; as well as within sociology or social psychology, with their use of 
identity (Sollberger, 2013).  That is, all of these constructs make use of James’ distinction 
(for a discussion, see for example, Fournier, et al, 2015; Sollberger, 2013; Tagini & 
Reffone, 2010). However, while James is careful to maintain a distinction between the Self, 
the parts of Self, and Identity, this is not always the case within psychology, where the 
terms are often used interchangeably.  Noting this overlap, Kaufman, Montgomery, and 
Crowell (2014) explain that the literatures on self and identity have developed in relative 
isolation from each other, with work in one area seldom referencing work in the other. (For 
a more detailed discussion on identity, and its overlap with self, see Schwartz, Luyckx, & 
Vignoles, 2011).  Kaufman, Montgomery, and Crowell (2014) suggest two areas of 
emphasis: the developmental literature, which has its efforts focused on normative identity 
development, and the clinical literature, which has its efforts focused on failures in 
normative identity development; as such, the authors suggest that the intersection of the 
developmental and clinical literatures function as a kind of vista, where one can more 
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easily identify similarities and discrepancies in the various instantiations of the Self and 
Identity as constructs, as they have unfolded over time within the literature. 
Erickson: Distinguishing Normative from Pathological Identity Development 
In outlining normative identity development, Erickson (1968) refers to James’ 
discussion of the “conscious sense of individual uniqueness,” the “I,” in its “unconscious 
striving for a continuity of experience” (p. 208), and suggests that the “me,” in its 
continuity, results from a developmental process—an “identity crisis—that ideally leads to 
ego-identity as an “integrated awareness and knowledge about oneself.”  Erikson’s 
conceptualization of normative identity development encompasses individuals’ exploration 
of, and eventually commitment to, self-defining roles.  As an adolescent explores these 
options, there are periods wherein that adolescent's identity is no longer consistent with his 
or her past self-concept (1956), and at least transitorily, periods wherein others’ view of 
him or her no longer corresponds to the adolescent’s current view of him/herself.  This 
identity crisis —characterized by a lack of temporal correspondence in identity 
conceptualizations, and lack of confirmation of those nascent conceptualizations by 
others—is both a typical and a transitory phase of development. 
The avoidance of such discomfort can only be maintained at the cost of failure to search 
out new self-related roles, selecting some and repudiating others, ultimately arriving at a 
particular sense of identity “fitted” for one’s self.  In contrast, Identity Diffusion 
characterizes a kind of failure of identity development.  
Working from clinical case conceptualizations, Erickson outlines a kind of common 
“space” akin to situational triggers—i.e., not an explanation of the etiology but of the 
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triggering confluence of events wherein identity diffusion emerges.  Paraphrasing 
Erickson, identity diffusion emerges wherein there is exposure to a grouping of experiences 
requiring simultaneous commitment to physical intimacy, occupational choice, energetic 
competition, and psychosocial self-definition—the central diffusion becomes manifest in 
(a) problems with intimacy—where there is the threat of engulfment or fusion, lack of 
repudiation (a kind of opposite to intimacy), and later theorists will add fear of threat of 
abandonment; (b) problems with perspective of time— with milder forms as an experience 
of urgency but also a loss of the consideration of time as a dimension of living.  Relatedly, 
Erickson describes these patients as struggling to go to sleep and wake, to regulate their 
days, but more generally, to regulate themselves and their lives… a kind of “the time has 
come and I will rise to the challenge” is markedly absent, or in other instances, is 
acknowledged but fought against; (c) diffusion of industry, where in the more severe cases 
of identity diffusion there is an upset in the sense of workmanship, in the ability to 
concentrate on a given task, or in pre-occupation with some one-sided thing to extent that it 
is self-destructive; and finally, (d) the choice of negative identity, which Erickson 
describes as a way to avoid total abrogation of identity, and which often has its origins in 
“those identifications and roles which, at critical stages of development, have been 
presented to the individual as most undesirable and dangerous, and yet also most real” (p. 
131). 
In Pathographic: The Clinical Picture of Identity Diffusion, Erickson (1959) 
remarks on his use of the term diffusion, commenting that he has repeatedly pointed out 
that his use of the term is not a “felicitous one.”  He explains that the most common 
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meaning of the term diffusion is a centrifugal dispersion of elements. However, centrifugal 
dispersion has the sense of a kind of maintenance about a center, and in identity diffusion, 
there is a “split of self-images… a loss of centrality; a sense of dispersion and confusion, 
and a fear of dissolution.”  
Borderline Personality and Borderline Personality Disorder 
The relevance of Erickson’s discussion has remained, both for normative as well as 
non-normative identity development. Notably, however, Erickson’s Pathographic of 
Identity Diffusion describes manifestations and sequelae of the so-called borderline 
personality; the structure of which Erickson describes as characterized by significant 
structural deficit (see quotes by Erickson in the last paragraph).  In contrast, borderline 
personality disorder is, strictly speaking, a diagnostic entity, where diagnosis is made on 
the basis of observable and/or self-reported behaviors, affects, and cognitions, which are 
thought to serve as indicators for the relevant diagnostic criteria  Borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) is a devastating mental illness, occurring at a rate of 1-5% within the 
general community and 15-20% of those already seeking treatment (i.e., clinical samples) 
(Swartz, Blazer, George & Winfield, 1990; Grant, Chou, Goldstein, Huang, Stinson, Saha, 
& Ruan, 2008). BPD is a complex disorder, in no small part owing to the “inconsistency 
factor” which is thought to characterize it (for example, see Hopwood & Zanarini, 2010).  
This inconsistency is often described as a kind of pervasive dysregulation (inability to 
regulate), characterized as instability of affect, behavior, cognition, and identity (Hoffman; 
NIMH Case Conference, 2007; DSM-IV/V; APA, 2000, 2013).  BPD is considered 
difficult to diagnose and even harder to treat (Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 
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2004)—a matter further complicated by the stigma associated with it, where patients, rather 
than the disorder, are considered difficult.  Meeting criteria is associated with recurrent 
episodes of suicidal behavior and suicide attempts (Skills, 2009), but, in part owing to that 
stigma, the literature has, historically,  remarked that such patients are merely manipulative 
and such suicidal acts are mere threats. However, recent meta-analytic data suggest a 10 
year suicide rate 50% above national averages (Pompili, Girardi, Ruberto, & Tatarelli, 
2005)—roughly 10% of those who meet criteria will complete suicide within the next 10 
years. Given the base rates to which these findings apply, attempts to reduce barriers to 
treatment, and increase clinical prowess aimed at detection and intervention, are warranted. 
Identity Dysregulation, Self-Schema, and Borderline Personality Disorder 
As it relates to BPD, the dysregulated identity component includes a broad array of 
indicators, characterized by a poorly developed self-concept, lacking coherence across time 
and place, where coherence—from the Latin cohaerere (com-"together"+ haerere "to 
stick")—quite literally refers to “a sticking together or uniting of parts,” such that there is 
“the quality of forming a unified whole” (Webster’s Dictionary, 1959, p. 520; OED, 
online). The dysregulated identity component can also be characterized as a poorly 
developed self-schema—a conceptual frame of reference lacking sufficient structural 
integrity to support the consistent and independent experience of one’s self as distinct from 
others, with reductions in patients’ ability to experience themselves as a unified whole (i.e., 
coherence), or to present a consistent impression across time and place—whether that 
impression regards affect, cognition, or behavior. 
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Identity Structure and Identity Content 
As described by Sollberger (2013), historically, most theorists have focused on 
Identity Coherence in terms of identity content (e.g., gender roles, vocational choice, 
political preferences, and religious beliefs), and the dimensions of identity (personal 
identity, social identity, and collective identity) to which those goals, values, and beliefs 
are directed.In a structurally-based view, the core of BPD pathology goes beyond content-
based impairments of identity integration, to the underlying structure which, ideally, 
provides support for that content. For instance, what Erickson describes as identity 
diffusion, or, the “loss of centrality” (1959). Regarding structural impairments, Kernberg 
would describe “internalized objects,” i.e., positive and negative aspects of the self and 
significant others, as not whole “representations” of the self and significant others 
(Kernberg, 1984). James might describe the I-Self as not able to hold together as one, or 
integrate, all of the Me-Selves, or more subjectively as the absence of the warmth, arising 
from the felt experience of sameness and continuity.2   The functional impact of these 
structural deficiencies regards impairments in the ability of identity to accommodate itself 
to disparate incoming perceptual content (i.e., content which quite literally calls into 
question our sense of who we are) as such tasks require sufficient narcissistic capacity and 
reserve (for an impassioned discussion, see Fisher, 1985).   
 
 
2 For more on this, refer to James’ discussion of disorders of memory, dissociative disorders, and disorders of 
identity in his Principles of Psychology (1890)
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In the structurally-based language of Kernberg (1975), insufficient narcissistic capacity, 
will result in an overly rigid, weak, or mixed, i.e., fragmented identity; or, in the 
attachment formation language described by Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall (1978); 
Bowlby (1988); Hesse & Main (2000), the potential weaknesses or structural deficits of 
identity can be conceptualized as overly rigid (avoidant), weak (anxious), or fragmented 
(disorganized)—although this language more so applies to Identity content and an 
orientation toward self and other than Identity structure, per se. 
 
Although often subtle, the clinical psychology literature is informed by and 
incorporates much of the (previously described) rich and diverse history of normative and 
non-normative self and identity, within BPD.  Moreover, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1952, 1968, 1980, 
1994, 2013) ideally represents any consensus within the field on their instantiations—for 
the purposes of facilitating clinical utility, involving the assessment, diagnosis, and 
treatment of disorders. 
Self and Identity in BPD throughout the DSM 
BPD first appeared in the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III; APA, 1980), where it is described as a kind of “instability in a 
variety of areas, including interpersonal behavior, mood, and self-image”; moreover, “no 
single feature is invariably present” (p. 321). As a criterion, identity disturbance is 
described as “manifested by uncertainty about several issues relating to identity, such as 
self-image, gender identity, long-term goals or career choice, friendship patterns, values, 
and loyalties, e.g., Who am I? I feel like I am my sister when I am good” (p. 323).  In 
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DSM-III Appendix B: Glossary of Technical Terms, identity is defined as “the sense of 
self, providing a unity of personality over time” (p. 361), and it is noted that prominent 
disturbances in identity or the sense of self are seen in Schizophrenia, Borderline 
Personality Disorder, and Identity Disorder. 
Early attempts to characterize the borderline disorder involved differentiating it 
from schizophrenia (see Gunderson, Autry, Gunderson, Mosher & Buchsbaum, 1974 for 
adetailed account); noteworthy elements of construct overlap are, perhaps, present in the 
description provided in DSM-III (APA, 1980) for disturbances in sense of self— 
descriptions which are provided for schizophrenia: 
“The sense of self that gives the normal person a feeling of individuality, uniqueness, 
and self-direction is frequently disturbed. This is sometimes referred to as a loss of ego 
boundaries and is frequently manifested by extreme perplexity about one's own identity 
and the meaning of existence…” (p. 183). 
The second construct mentioned—Identity Disorder—was intended to function as a 
diagnostic specifier, serving to maintain diagnostic continuity when the BPD diagnosis 
was not appropriate, given the age of the patient.  Identity disorder was later renamed 
Identity Problem (DSM-IV, 1994 p. 685) and relegated to “other conditions that may be 
a focus of clinical attention.”  DSM-III summarizes Identity Disorder patient 
phenomenology as “severe subjective distress regarding the inability to reconcile aspects 
of the self into a relatively coherent and acceptable sense of self,” and offers differential 
diagnostic guidelines with respect to BPD, where in BPD “identity disturbances are only 
one of several important areas of disturbance, and there is often considerable mood 
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disturbance.” These early descriptions—no longer included in the DSM—arguably 
provide some of the richest material for conceptualizing problematical identity. 
Within the DSM-IV/DSM-5-II system (1994, 2013), BPD is summarized as a 
“pattern of instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image and affects, and marked 
impulsivity,” and the problematic identity component is most explicitly characterized by 
the third BPD-criterion: “a markedly or persistently unstable self-image or sense of 
self”[emphasis added], although a number of additional criteria have been theorized as 
rooted in problematical identity or self-states, including: chronic feelings of emptiness, 
impulsivity, self-harm, and instability in interpersonal relationships (for a discussion, see, 
for example, Crawford, Cohen, Johnson, Sneed, & Brook, 2004, p. 383; Jorgensen, 2006, 
and for experimentally-derived evidence of the primacy of identity dysregulation in the 
cascade of borderline symptomatology, see Lowmaster, 2013). 
DSM-5-Alternative Model:  Distinguishing Structure from Content 
While the official personality disorder diagnostic system remained unchanged from 
DSM-IV to DSM-5, the DSM-5 Personality and Personality Disorders (P&PD) Work 
Group introduced a substantially revised “Alternative Model” (DSM-5-AM), where 
diagnostic assignment requires determination of the level of severity of impairment in 
personality functioning (Level of Personality Functioning Scale, LPFS), and the selection 
of maladaptive personality trait-descriptors.  The LPFS was the first measure of generalized 
severity to be incorporated into the DSM, an addition long conceptualized as essential (e.g., 
Crawford et al., 2011; Livesley & Jang, 2000); Parker et al. 2002, Pulay et al., 2008; Tyrer 
2005; Wakefield 1992; 2008)
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In the Alternative Model, the current level of personality functioning is assessed along two 
core domains, each with two sub-components: intrapersonal or Self-functioning is 
assessed as Identity and Self-direction—and interpersonal functioning is assessed as 
Empathy and Intimacy. Here, Identity is understood as: “[the] experience of oneself as 
unique, with clear boundaries between self and others; stability of self-esteem and accuracy 
of self- appraisal; capacity for and ability to regulate a wide range of emotional 
experience.” A BPD-specific characterization of identity functioning is provided, and 
understood to be “markedly impoverished, poorly developed, or unstable self-image, often 
associated with excessive self-criticism; chronic feelings of emptiness; dissociative states 
under stress.”  Next, maladaptive personality trait-descriptors are selected from the 
domains of negative affect, disinhibition, and antagonism—but, the overarching construct 
which is tapped in trait-selection regards typology—that is, trait selection is intended to 
address the problematical, prototypical styles of the diagnosis.  In contrast, the level of 
functioning specifier addresses the current state functioning, theoretically independent of 
any stylistic specifiers.  Notably, this two-part diagnostic process maps on to the 
distinctions presented at the outset between the coherence or structure of the personality 
system and the content of that structure—where the degree of structural integrity maps to 
the current level of functioning, just as the content of that structure maps to the stylistic 
components delineated by the traits included in the Alternate Model. 
Empirical Explorations: Self and Identity in BPD; Identity Coherence 
In Grinker, Werble, and Drye’s (1968, p. 176) classical empirical study of
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borderline conditions, absence of indication of self-identity was listed as one of the four 
principal characteristics of the borderline syndrome, and Spitzer, Endicott, and Gibbon 
(1979) presented some of the first empirical findings that identity disturbance is one of the 
defining criteria for the borderline disorder.  A more recent empirical examination 
(Wilkinson-Ryan & Westen, 2000), suggested four identity disturbance factors: role 
absorption (where patients tend to define themselves in terms of a single role or cause), 
painful incoherence (a subjective sense of lack of coherence), inconsistency (an objective 
incoherence in thought, feeling, and behavior), and lack of commitment (e.g., to jobs or 
values). The authors suggested that all four factors uniquely predicted BPD, but 
particularly painful incoherence—comprised of items indicating a sense of “false self,” a 
lack of sense of continuity of self over time, and a sense of emptiness— distinguished 
patients with borderline personality disorder (compared to those with other and no 
personality disorder diagnosis).3 
One line of clinical theorists summarizes such lack of continuity and incoherence as 
sequelae of a “false self.” Most generally, as described by Laing (1965, p. 94), “the false 
self is one way of not being oneself.”4   More specifically, the false self describes an 
 
3 Identification of these factors was through the use of therapist-identified characteristics related to patient 
phenomenology. 
4 As noted by Laing (1959, p. 94), discussion of the “false self” can be sourced through an existentialist 
orientation, for example with Heidegger (1953), Kierkegaard (1954), and Sartre (1956), as well as through a 
psychoanalytic orientation, for example with Fairbairn (1952), Guntrip (1952), and Winnicott (1958, for 
instance, section III, Clinical Material: Aspects of Fantas). Informed by these early contributions is Laing 
(1959), and later, Miller (1979) and Masterson (1989).  Prior to discussion, per se, regarding the false self, 
informative are the stories relating the behavior of Theseus to both Ariadne and Phaedra—Racine’s version of 
the tale—or of course Ovid’s portrayal of Narcissus’ treatment of both Echo as well as himself).  See also 
Laing’s footnote on page 94 of The Divided Self.  
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existence characterized by the lack of a “real, true” identity, where the existence of such a 
true self would give rise to an ongoing sense of who one is—coherent and consistent across 
time and space—as evident across the various intra- and interpersonal roles expected by 
daily life.   One analogy for understanding the false self is that of the social mask; while 
(nearly) all social interaction requires that individuals wear “masks”— intended to present 
thoughts, feelings, behaviors, etc., which are not wholly representative of one’s thoughts, 
feelings, behaviors—the “false self,” in contrast, is more so a permanent mask and serves 
to protect against the vulnerability of a condition where, to varying degrees, there is not a 
“real self” underneath. Without this “real self” underneath the mask, it is, perhaps, not the 
individual who enters into the social situation, but rather the social situation which elicits 
the individual—in the most extreme cases, the mask is ever created anew.   In all cases, it is 
the degree to which an individual experiences a true core self which enables them to enter 
into most any kind of situation, and despite the power of that situation, maintain not only 
their sense of who they are, but also present thoughts, feelings, and behaviors consistent 
with that ongoing sense of self—i.e., to remain true to themselves (Masterson, 1989; 
Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002).  A rather similar point is made by an extensive 
literature on the interaction of the power of the person and the power of the situation in 
determining human behavior (Mischel, 1968). 
Recently, Sollberger et al. (2011) investigated the relation between identity 
diffusion and psychopathology in 52 in-patients receiving treatment for BPD.  Findings 
suggested that those identified as high identity diffusion (i.e., low coherence) showed  
 19 
 
significantly higher levels of psychiatric symptoms, including anxiety, anger, and 
depression scores (p < .01), as well as increased concurrent personality disorder diagnosis 
(p < .05). Assessment measures included the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO) 
and questionnaires measuring general psychiatric symptoms, mood states, and negative 
affect. Moreover, within BPD samples, identity disturbance has been investigated as a 
transdiagnostic construct (Neacsiu, Herr, Rodriguez, & Rosenthal, 2015). For instance, 
impairments in self-concept (identity disturbance) have been found to differentiate 
adolescents with BPD and comorbid major depressive disorder (MDD) from adolescents 
with MDD alone (Pinto, Grapentine, Francis, & Picariello, 1996), which suggests the 
identity deficit in BPD is a core component, and not merely an artifact of depressive 
severity.  Reductions in sense of self (self-concept clarity) have been correlated with 
neuroticism, a marker for depression (Campbell et al., 1996), and identity disturbance has 
been correlated with both a heightened risk for substance use disorders (Rao, Vasudevan, 
& Nammalvar, 1981; Talley, Tomko, Littlefield, Trull, & Sher, 2011), as well as high 
anxiety in adolescents (Crocetti, Klimstra, Keijsers, Hale, & Meeus, 2009). 
While the identity construct has been a subject of some study, empirical 
investigations of Identity coherence are quite limited. One method has involved the coding 
of patient narrative for coherence—where coherence is examined as an ability to integrate, 
organize, and tell a story about the self. The results of one investigation suggested that 
borderline personality features—assessed with the borderline subscale of the Personality 
Assessment Inventory (PAI-BOR; Morey, 1991)—were significantly 
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negatively associated with narrative coherence; that is, participants with greater borderline 
features were less able to integrate and organize stories about their self (Lovasz, 2009). 
The only known experimental manipulation involving identity coherence to date 
(Lowmaster, 2013) grouped undergraduates based on the borderline features subscale of the 
PAI. In the test group, participants provided descriptors of their “True Self,” the process of 
which is similar to narrative tasks, in that it theoretically taps participant’s ability to provide 
a coherent view of the self.  In the control condition, participants provided, essentially, 
synonyms for the word “Round,” or examples of things that are round, such as, for example, 
a pizza, which is round. Self-reported measures of self- concept clarity (SCC; Campbell et 
al., 1996), as well as additional measures, were taken immediately prior to and immediately 
following the manipulation, and in counterbalanced order, participants completed computer-
administered tasks assessing behavior, where those behaviors are considered to be indicators 
of borderline pathology—a GoStop task of disinhibition (measuring response sets and the 
ability to inhibit a response) and a trust task measuring interpersonal functioning. 
Findings suggested that all participants, regardless of identity coherence, consistently rated 
the true-self task as more difficult than a control verbal fluency task. Following the True Self 
Task (self-description), however, participants classified as having high levels of borderline 
features rated the True-Self task as more difficult, and their performance on the GoStop 
task—a measure of borderline symptomatology (disinhibition)—worsened. In contrast, 
performance (on the GoStop task) improved for those participants classified with low levels 
of borderline features.
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For those participants grouped as high on borderline features, the process of providing the 
True Self descriptors appears to have had a dysregulating effect, and while it may be that, for 
those participants grouped as low on borderline features, the process of providing descriptors 
was actually regulating, as evidenced by their improved behavioral control on the GoStop 
task, what is very clear, however, is the power of Lowmaster’s design to “tap” the 
underlying “self system.” 
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TOWARD A BEHAVIORAL INDICATOR OF IDENTITY COHERENCE 
 
The Lowmaster paradigm was the first to successfully manipulate identity coherence, 
with both self-report and behavioral indicators of borderline symptomatology serving as 
measures of that success.  More specifically, the GoStop task, as a behavioral indicator of 
dyscontrol, provides BPD-relevant markers of functioning related to impulsivity. 
Additionally, Lowmaster (2013) used an interpersonal trust task, which provides a 
behavioral indicator of interpersonal functioning. To date, however, the clinical literature 
provides no behavioral indicator of identity coherence.  There is a need to establish 
behavioral indicators of identity coherence, as current forms of assessment rely exclusively 
on variants of self and other-based reports and/or interview methodologies.  Such an 
approach could have broad application; within intervention research, for example, as a 
paradigm implemented at baseline and follow up to provide clinically relevant markers of 
patient functioning. 
Background on the Self-Reference Effect 
The Self-Reference Effect (SRE) (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977) is an empirically-
derived and highly replicated cluster of related findings (Klein & Nelson, 2015) from 
cognitive psychology which suggest that information considered for its perceived relevance 
to the self is generally recalled to a greater extent, and with greater accuracy, than 
information which is merely semantically meaningful (for a meta-analytic review, see 
Symons & Johnson, 1997).  In a basic self-reference paradigm (See Table 1), participants 
are shown a series of items (usually words and often personality traits), and they are asked 
to consider those words in one of two ways.  In the semantic condition, they consider 
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semantic meaningfulness of the words with a question such, e.g., “Does this word mean the 
same [as another]?” and in the self-reference condition, they consider the self-relevance of 
the word with a question such, e.g., “does this word describe you?” Participants are later 
instructed “to write down as many words as you can recall.” Assuming an equal number of 
words across conditions, the formula for computing the self-reference effect (SRE) is simply 
the number of words accurately recalled in the self- referent condition minus the number of 
words accurately recalled in the semantic condition. 
The investigative methodology for the Self-Reference Effect was an outgrowth of 
the Depth-of-Processing paradigm (DoP) (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  In a traditional DoP 
paradigm, subjects are asked to process an item at one of three levels (see Table 2), and in 
the most basic level, the items are not considered for semantic meaningfulness, but rather 
for some non-semantic quality of the word, such as its structure (e.g., how it looks) or its 
sound (e.g., whether it rhymes with another word). This is called the Shallow Condition 
(sometimes Structural or Phonetic). In each instance, the participant remains the same; the 
stimuli (target words) remain the same, but the task condition changes, so as to generate 
systematic variability in the depth, or breadth of item processing. Repeated findings suggest 
that considering the semantic meaning produced a more elaborate memory trace than the 
Shallow Condition (i.e., participants remembered more words).5 
 
 
5 Notably, SRE paradigms still generally include the Shallow Condition, although generally, neither the 
structural or phonetic task conditions are considered necessary to examine for the SRE itself; that is, the 
semantic orienting task is thought to provide the appropriate comparison, insofar as the SRE condition is 
posited as, fundamentally, a semantic encoding condition. 
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The initial explanation provided was that what varied across the structural and semantic 
encoding conditions was the depth of processing required to perform the relevant semantic 
extraction.  However, as the understanding of the mechanism of action for the task 
developed, the strength of a memory trace has become understood as a positive function of 
the degree of elaboration of the encoded trace (memory)—with structural ratings producing 
the least elaborate and semantic ratings the most elaborate memory traces—where a rough 
conceptualization of “elaborate” is the “spread” of potential trace-activation in retrieval. 6 
 
6 Regarding depth (or levels) or processing, verses breadth (or spread) of activation: Most generally, depth of 
information processing can be thought of as the degree of semantic extraction required for information 
processing to occur, and which is considered the core feature thought to vary across the different task 
conditions (i.e., Self, Semantic, and Shallow), where the shallow condition does not require semantic 
processing, and the Self condition requires the same degree of processing as the semantic plus consideration of 
relevance to one’s self, or personal meaningfulness. Regarding breadth of processing, Anderson and Reder 
(1979) further explicate: “the variation in memory with [depth of processing] (DOP) is a result of the number 
of elaborations subjects produce while studying the material, that these elaborations establish more redundant 
encodings of the to-be-remembered information, and that elaboration is what is critical, especially for long-
term retention. Because extent of elaboration is the critical variable, a better spatial metaphor for the DOP 
phenomena might be ‘breadth of processing’” (p. 385). While Anderson & Reder’s (1979) description is clear, 
the somewhat colloquial use of “depth” has remained in vogue when describing the core differences in 
information processing though to be elicited by the different task conditions (i.e., Self, Semantic, and 
Shallow), where here, depth seems intended to describe the varying degree of semantic extraction required for 
information processing—how “deeply” 
one must process an item. 
The relevance of this aside to the overarching discussion on the functioning of identity may be clarified by 
longstanding discussions in the literature regarding whether the self is the actual cause of the self- reference 
effect, or whether some combination of the qualities of organization, elaboration, and distinctiveness, are the 
cause—where those qualities describe the type of information processing that is elicited by the task 
condition. (For an overview of the discussion, see Symons and Johnson, 1997.) 
While these discussions have been ongoing in cognitive psychology, a modern psychodynamic personality 
theorist might describe those supposedly informational qualities (i.e., organization, elaboration, and 
distinctiveness) as precisely the kind of information processing which is facilitated by a well-developed, well-
organized, self. Moreover, such a theorist might even use those terms to describe a structurally  sound, well-
functioning self—that is, one is that organized and distinct, and yet elaborate. Ultimately, should the Self-
Reference Effect have some utility for the study of identity, identity researchers may find there is a differential 
utility in the use of terms depth or breadth, perhaps specifically in the conceptualization of the “distribution” of 
memory-spread / self-referent memory (or perhaps also autobiographical memory) within a “dysregulated” 
identity structure. 
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(For a discussion on the distinction between depth and breadth, as related to 
identity, see the second paragraph of footnote 7.) The Self-Reference Effect was 
discovered when perceived relevance to the self was added as an additional, Semantic, 
level of processing (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977)—one providing an additional level of 
“enrichment” (p. 679), resulting in a more elaborate memory trace (i.e., enhanced recall 
compared to the Semantic Condition). 
In the Self-Reference Effect, the Self is postulated as a superordinate schema, engaged in 
information management—hierarchically prioritizing and encoding information based on 
its perceived self-relevance.  Activation of this superordinate schema theoretically 
facilitates more elaborate information processing, which facilitates enhanced incidental 
retention (recall), by increasing the spread of activation for any given memory trace—or 
more simply, the degree of interconnectedness between any two or more given bits of 
information, such that activating (recalling) one bit facilitates activation (recall) of any other 
(previously connected) bit. Inclusive of the-self-as- schema-model, the self can be 
considered in terms of its content, its structure, as well as its function—where content 
refers to what is hierarchically organized and stored in long- term memory,7 and which has 
been "derived from a lifetime of experience with personal data" (Rogers, et al., 1977, p. 
677); whereas the structure/function of the self regards the how is information processed 
and organized (both as a matter of procedural process and its “form” at “destination”) 
(Kuiper & Derry, 1980; 1981), as well as the how well is that information processed and 
organized. 
 
7 Although this model is approaching outdated, it still functions as a conceptual mechanism. 
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Meta-Analytic Findings 
To date, a robust pattern of SRE- relevant findings have emerged in support of the 
hypothesis originally formulated by Rogers, et al. (1977): “The self serves an active and 
powerful role in the processing of personal data.”  In a 20-year meta-analytic review of the 
SRE literature, Symons and Johnson (1997) perform a detailed review of the cross-literature 
models for the family of findings collectively referred to as the SRE, as well as examined for 
patterns in effect-size estimates for within-class mediators and moderators.  The results 
suggest a pooled mean weighted effect-size estimate for the Self-referent verses semantic 
condition of d+ = .65 (k = 60; 95% CI = .58 - .71). To obtain homogeneity of effect-size 
estimates, 11 outliers (18%) were removed, resulting in a pooled mean weighted estimate d+ 
= .59 (95% CI = .52 - .66), with a mean unweighted d = .72 (95% CI = .58 - .86). It should 
be noted however this is an overall class estimate for SR-Semantic and so includes free and 
cued recall as well as recognition (the CI for which include zero, i.e., it is non-significant as 
a class).8  
Clinically-Relevant Investigations and Distinguishing Content from Structure 
Modifications of the SRE paradigm have been utilized to investigate the role of the 
self in clinically related disorders.   
 
 
8 While a number of studies have found effects with tests of recognition memory as the follow up, primarily 
this is in testing for a Self-Referent Effect in contrast to the memory effect facilitated by the use of another 
person (e.g., does this word describe your mom?)—not the Self-referent verses semantic conditions 
described in the current investigation. 
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While the stated intent is often to investigate for the presence of a self-referent effect, the 
majority of these studies utilize a self-referent task condition (e.g., “does this word describe 
you?”) where the trait descriptors tap an element of mood, affect, and/or valence, thought to 
be salient to the disorder under investigation, and the descriptors themselves are selected to 
represent bimodal extremes of that salient continuum.  For instance, to address questions 
such as: “do depressed individuals have a tendency to attend to and/or encode more 
negative than positive or neutral trait descriptors?” Both depressed participants and a non-
depressed control group are presented with a list of, for example, positive (e.g., lively; 
gregarious) and negative (e.g., morose, sullen) and diagnostic-condition neutral (e.g., 
intellectual) trait descriptors. The outcome of interest is the tendency to remember more 
negative than positive or diagnostically neutral descriptors, relative to diagnostic standing. 
So for example, a person diagnosed with depression would be hypothesized to recall more 
words with depressed content. While the stated intent of study designs such as these is 
detect a self- reference effect (i.e., a memory advantage facilitated by or attributable to the 
additional depth of processing, or, the additional “spread” of trace activation, offered by the 
self, it seems rather that the design more so provides an indication of the consistency or 
inconsistency of descriptor-content with a participants’ self content or view of their self 
content; or, the affective quality of participants’ self content and the effect of affect on self-
relevant memory (Derry & Kuiper, 1981). Some studies involving clinically relevant 
variance in item content are used in concert with, for example, fMRI or ERP (for instance, 
see Zhao et al., 2014), and it is likely that the areas and/or networks of brain activation as 
well as degree of activation are similar to the findings from studies of self-referential 
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processing of diagnostically-irrelevant trait information, but to our knowledge, this has not 
been investigated. 
In contrast to studies using a self-reference paradigm to examine for diagnostically 
relevant differences in recalled or recognized item content, a small body of clinically-
relevant literature has emerged focusing on the content-independent memory advantage 
offered by the self.  In these cases, the SRE paradigm has been utilized to examine 
disorders such as autism and schizophrenia—disorders theorized to involve a 
characteristic lack of self, with corresponding, measurable, deficits in intra- and 
interpersonal functioning. 
Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2007) utilized a self- referent 
paradigm to examine the extent to which autism-spectrum conditions (ASC) are related to 
impairments in the intrapersonal self-referential domain. Thirty adults (age 19-45) 
diagnosed with either Asperger Syndrome or high-functioning autism, were matched with 
30 healthy controls on age, sex, and IQ.  Participants judged adjectives in relation to the 
self, a non-social semantic control condition, and two other task conditions outside the 
scope of the current review.9   While a significant SRE was seen in individuals with ASC 
for adjectives rated with respect to the self, the observed effect was significantly decreased 
compared to the effect found for matched controls. 
Utilizing a methodology similar to Lombardo et al. (2007), Harvey et al. (2011) 
investigated self-referent processing in a group of twenty-five patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and 22 controls.
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Participants rated personality adjectives in each of three conditions: (1) structural features 
(determining whether words are presented in uppercase or lowercase letters); (2) social 
desirability (determining whether the words presented  are socially desirable or not); or (3) 
self-referential (determining whether the words presented describe oneself or not?). 
Recognition memory for these personality adjectives was then tested during an unexpected 
yes–no recognition test. While patients and controls were comparable in memory 
performance for the control conditions (structural  p = 0.12 and social desirability p = 
0.30), patients showed significantly reduced recognition sensitivity compared to controls 
for the self-referential condition (p = 0.03). 
Finally, some studies have utilized combinations of the above, without sufficient 
appreciation for the nature of the task.  For instance, Winter et al. (2015) reported a 
negative evaluation bias for positive self-referential information in borderline PD, where 
BPD patients (n = 30) and healthy control participants (n = 30) rated the positive, neutral, 
and negative emotional valence of words.  The self-referential context, however, was varied 
by the study authors, not by the participant’s determination; specifically, stimulus 
presentation (nouns) was preceded by a self-referential pronoun (“my”), an other-
referential pronoun (e.g., Marie’s”), or no referential context (“the”).  The results of a 
subsequent free recall and recognition task suggested that BPD individuals differed from 
controls in judgment of item content—positive and neutral words were judged to be more 
negative than the same words by healthy control participants. 
 
9 The remaining task conditions involved a similar close-other (i.e., a friend), and a dissimilar non-close other 
(in this instance, Harry Potter). 
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However, the authors’ findings that BPD patients did not differ from controls for self-
referent memory cannot be interpreted, given the study design. 
Interestingly, there is a notable literature involving the use of SRE paradigms with 
diagnostic entities theorized to involve problematical self structures, such as schizophrenia 
and autism.  In these studies, however, there is a decided lack of available findings on the 
SRE itself (i.e., data are often not provided on the number of words recalled or recognized 
in the sematic and self-referent conditions). The reason for this is due, at least in part, to 
the use of the SRE paradigm as a behavioral task in concert with laboratory tasks designed 
to investigate the cognitive and neural correlates of self- referential processing. 
Overview and Selection of Design Characteristics 
As mentioned previously, the SRE refers to a family of related findings with similar but 
distinct methodologies (see Klein, 2016 for an overview).  To facilitate the aims of the 
current endeavor, it was necessary to select an appropriate methodological course; ideally, 
one capable of maximally facilitating the detection of Self-referent effect findings and 
simultaneously reducing potential confounds. To identify a design with a 
history of detecting self-referent effects, a detailed review of the cross-literature models for 
the family of findings collectively referred to as the SRE was performed—to identify 
patterns in effect-size estimates for significant between and within-class mediators and 
moderators. Presented here is an overview of the design characteristics which were 
reviewed, and unless noted otherwise, analyses reported here were those performed by 
Symons and Johnson (1997): 
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Memory test (dependent variable) was examined as free recall (k = 54, d+ = .69, 
95% CI = .62 - .65), cued recall (k = 2, d+ = .60, 95% CI = .02 - 1.18) and recognition (k 
= 4, d+ = .21, 95% CI = .00 - .43). While the overall between-class effect was significant, 
post-hoc comparisons suggest free recall differed significantly from cued recall and 
recognition, but that cued recall and recognition did not differ significantly from one 
another—a finding which is further emphasized by the provided confidence intervals. 
Semantic (control) task conditions. For example, control tasks where participants 
generate a definition or evaluate synonyms were associated with mean weighted effect 
sizes of 1.04 and .72 respectively, but were not statistically significantly different at 
post-hoc comparison; given the limited number of studies to employ “generate a 
definition” (n = 4) the results for the synonym condition can likely be considered more 
reliable.10 
Stimulus (traits verses nouns) reported mean weighted effect sizes of .67 and .40, 
respectively, and were statistically significantly different. 
Amount of Stimulus. As the number of words or memory load increased, the SRE 
also increased for traits (k = 47, β = .26, p < .01); however, when the stimulus items were 
nouns, the pattern reversed itself (k = 11, β = -.47, p < .01). In this case, as memory load 
increased, the SRE got smaller. 
 
 
10 Such a paradigm relies on the careful performance of its participants. An “index” of participant attention 
can come from the task itself, insofar as the task requires that participants indicate whether the words are 
synonyms, and if a shallow condition is used as well, whether the words are capitalized. Agreement can 
quickly be assessed in a cross-tabulation / signal-detection model. 
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Type of Stimulus Processing. Relational, item-specific or both types of stimuli 
suggested mean weighted effect sizes of .51, .56 and .29, respectively. All effects were 
significant. Study designs using either relational or item-specific processing had a 
significantly larger effect than designs employing both relational and item-specific 
processing. 
Presentation Time. Stimulus Presentation Time (length of time stimulus appeared 
on a screen) and time between encoding and memory test (in min) were both significant 
predictors of the magnitude of SRE effect sizes across the literature—the SRE tended to 
increase as the time between the encoding and memory tasks increased (k = 60, β = .16, 
p < .05) and to decrease as the length of stimulus presentation grew longer (k = 60, β = - 
.60, p < .001). 
Overall, the findings from the review suggested the basic design elements utilized 
by Rogers, et al. (1977, Experiment 1)—a SRE paradigm consisting of three task conditions 
(see Table 1), where each participant provides ratings on the entire adjective set and target 
words are alternated to facilitate an equal number of “yes” and “no” responses for the 
structural and semantic tasks.  (While this is not possible to accomplish for the self-
description condition, as noted by Rogers, et al., 1977), there are nevertheless 
considerations of likelihood, depending on such factors as social desirability, 
meaningfulness, and likeability—perhaps particularly for stimuli potentially associated 
with demographic- or diagnostic-group standing—a highly relevant consideration within 
the current investigation.) Additionally, rating times are monitored for each judgment, with 
ratings followed by an incidental recall period. 
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A final review was performed, to identify the studies highlighted by Symons & 
Johnson (1997) with the same encoding and retrieval conditions as Rogers, et al., (1977). 
This process yielded a total of 8 studies (see Table 3), which were consulted in 
formulating the current proposal—either for clarification regarding specific aspects of the 
method, or to provide more informed estimates of effect size (Katz, 1987; Kendzierski, 
1980; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Pullyblank et al., 1985; Register & Kihlstrom, 1987; 
Rogers, et al., 1977; Sutton et al., 1988). Having arrived at a proposed design, next was 
the process of selecting trait descriptors. 
Stimuli List Development 
Following an extensive review, it was determined that there is little to no uniformity 
in the stimuli used in previous studies involving self-reference paradigms, making it 
necessary to construct a list of stimulus adjectives for use in the proposed 
investigation.(Table 4 presents the final series of 5-paired lists.)  As previously mentioned, 
there are a number of concerns related to the selection of stimuli and the possibility of 
eliciting responses that relate more to some element of diagnostic standing than to self-
reference, per se.  For instance, there is a large body of evidence on the differential impact 
of emotion for individuals meeting criteria for BPD.  For a brief review of empirical 
findings, see Baer, Peters, Eisenlohr-Moul, Geiger, and Sauer, 2012. There is evidence of 
compartmentalization of positive and negatively-valenced self related content (Vater, 
Schroder-Abe, Weizgerber, Roepke, & Schutz, 2014), and in contrast to studies of the Self-
Reference Effect with normative populations, where there is a tendency to remember more 
positive than negatively-valenced items regarding oneself (D’Argembeau, Comblain,
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& Linden, 2005), findings from Fertuck et al. (2006) suggest that individuals elevated on 
BPD-symptomatology tend to remember more negative than positively-valenced 
personality trait descriptors.  Most concerning for the present study are the findings from 
Fertuck et al. (2006) which suggest that, when a negative-valence state is induced, 
individuals elevated on BPD-symptomatology tend to show significant reductions in 
memory capacity—relative to controls.  In contrast to paradigms specifically intending to 
examine these and other relatively established group differences, the current investigation 
intends, specifically, not to capitalize on these differences, but rather, to determine whether 
there is a reliably detectable difference in the self-referent effect in groups who differ in 
their standing on the construct of interest—identity coherence.  Given these concerns, the 
main goal was to select stimuli with little likelihood of eliciting differences in preferential 
attention, encoding, and subsequent recall, based on participants standing on the construct 
of interest. Notably, previous investigations of the big-5 domains of personality 
(Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism) have 
suggested differences between those meeting criteria for BPD and control groups on all 
domains except the Introversion/Extroversion and Openness/Intellect Domains of the Big-5 
(for example, see Morey et al., 2002).  This consideration, along with the a literature base 
extensive enough to support the claim that normative data exists on the Big-5 model 
suggested that the big-5 domains of Introversion/Extroversion and Openness/Intellect were 
an ideal starting point for stimuli selection. 
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Overview of Stimuli Selection. The Big-5 is the result of a lexical approach to the 
development of a scientific taxonomy, but one rooted in the assumption that the salience of 
descriptors for personality research is informed by the degree to which those words are 
used and considered meaningful in day to day life (for a detailed discussion, see John 
& Srivastava, 1999).  As such, Anderson’s (1968) norms on word-meaningfulness were 
reviewed.  Next, given the proposed investigation would require individuals to indicate the 
degree to which a trait-descriptor is or is not self-descriptive,  Anderson’s (1968) norms on 
word- likability were reviewed, as a proximal measure of social desirability. The first 
group of potential items came from an item bank, wherein 300 terms from the Adjective 
Check List (ACL; Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) were reviewed by a set of ten judges.  Each 
judge independently sorted each of the 300 items in the ACL into one of the Big-Five 
domains or a sixth "other" category. Inter-judge agreement was substantial; coefficient 
alpha reliabilities ranged from .90 for Factor IV to .94 for Factor V, suggesting that the 
raters had formed a consensually shared understanding of the five dimensions.  The result 
was the mapping of 112-items onto one of the Big-5 dimensions. All items from the 
Introversion/Extroversion and Openness/Intellect Domains were selected as potential items 
for the current study. 
Next, Goldberg’s (1992) 100-item unipolar trait descriptive adjectives set was 
consulted and the items from the Surgency (i.e., Introversion/Extroversion) and Intellect 
Domains were selected as potential items for the current study. From these two lists, there 
was a total of 86 potential items, but of the 86 items, 16 overlapped, resulting in 70 potential 
items.
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These 70 items were then cross-referenced with two sets of norms: the Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW: Bradley & Lang, 1999), and Anderson’s (1968) Likableness 
ratings of 555 personality-trait words, a highly cited reference for word meaningfulness 
and likability—specifically, the likability of an individual who is seen as exhibiting the 
particular trait descriptor. Of the 70 items, 16 items did not appear in either the ANEW or 
Anderson, resulting in a final proposed target list of 54 trait descriptors selected from the 
Introversion/Extroversion and Openness/Intellect Domains. Six (6) additional items were 
selected independent of those domains to serve as buffers against primacy and recency 
effects. Table 5 presents a sample stimuli list with the corresponding word norms just 
described. 
Semantic (Synonym) condition.  To construct the semantic condition, it was 
necessary to create two additional lists of synonyms and antonyms. An additional 54 
synonym items were identified, following the procedure described by Rogers, through the 
use of Roget’s Thesaurus.  The additional items can all be considered trait descriptors, and 
while as synonyms they share a marked similarity with the descriptors from the domains of 
Introversion/Extroversion and Openness/Intellect, they are not specifically sourced from 
that literature.  None of the synonyms selected overlap with the target words (i.e., there are 
102 unique words). To complete the semantic condition, a third list of trait descriptors 
needed to be assembled, this one semantically unrelated to the target list.  In construction 
of this list, a number of the descriptors used in the synonym condition were re-used in this 
condition but were selected across domains, such that participants will not see the same 
word twice. 
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Structural condition. To construct the list for the structural condition, the target list 
was reused, once in upper-case and once in lower-case.  Again, participants will not see a 
target word more than once.  In contrast, the same six buffer words are held constant 
across all five lists (see section below on Primacy and Recency).  All five lists are 
presented in Table 4 and are color coded by domain (Introversion=light purple, 
Extroversion=dark purple; Openness/Intellect hi=light green; low=dark green), and 
function (orienting words=orange; buffer=blue). 
Stimuli Randomization 
To help ensure that each participant (a) provided a rating on all adjectives, with (b) 
equal exposure to each cue condition, and (c) to reduce the likelihood of response sets, the 
methodology of Myers, Lynch, and Bakal (1989) was heavily consulted, in addition to the 
eight studies cited previously, with particular emphasis on Rogers, , et al., (1977). 
The randomization procedure operated such that all participants were shown an identical 
list of target words, but the order of the word list varied by participant. Additionally, each 
target word appeared in only one of the three encoding conditions (i.e., structural, semantic, 
or self-referent) and the assignment of each word to a condition was determined at random 
by DirectRT (2012), the proprietary software utilized for data collection.11 
 
 
11 Future investigations will seek to employ a counterbalanced presentation of item blocks, as there is a need 
to control for item-response sets (or Condition X item-response sets), and more generally to measure any 
systematic effects of this first list of words on participants’ processing and later retrieval. 
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Given the finding noted by Rogers, et al., (1977) that yes-rated items are generally 
recalled to a greater degree than no-rated items, one synonym and one structural cue were 
designed to illicit a yes response and one synonym and one structural cue designed to illicit 
a no response. As noted by Rogers, et al.,  (1977), it is impossible to have experimental 
control over yes and no responses in the self-referent condition, because the person's view 
dictates the response.  Appendix A provides an overview of the procedure employed to 
generate a random distribution of the Yes and No responses.  
Controlling for Unintended Memory Effects 
Primacy and Recency. To address potential concerns of memory effects related to 
primacy and recency, an additional six adjectives were selected to serve as buffer items 
(see Table 4).  The content of the buffer items was based on three factors: average ratings 
on the Anderson scale norms of likability; lack of perceived resemblance to any of the 
Big-5 domains; lack of apparent salience to borderline-personality pathology. 
Timing of Trials. Of the total 16 self-referent/semantic (synonym) paradigms 
reviewed by Symons & Johnson (1997), only one provided a detailed account of the timing 
of its trials, Bargh & Tota (1988) (d = 1.37; 95% CI = 0.76 - 1.97).  In the methodology of 
Bargh and Tota (1988), each trial began with the message "Next trial follows," which 
appeared for 1 second on the screen, followed by a 1 second pause, during which the 
screen was blank. Next, the question to be answered regarding the upcoming stimulus item 
was presented (at the top of the screen), and 1 second later the stimulus item was presented 
(underneath the question). 
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Participants made their response and, after an additional pause, such that the total duration 
of each trial was 7 seconds, notification was given of the next trial (i.e., "Next trial 
follows"). In contrast to Bargh and Tota (1988), more current technology allows the 
presentation of multiple stimuli on the same screen, which makes it possible to have 
significantly smaller inter-stimulus intervals.  Moreover, while Bargh and Tota (1988) 
utilized a fixed duration for stimulus presentation (i.e., 7 seconds), the purpose of the 
duration primarily was related to their specific methodology.  Similar to the discussion 
above regarding item depth and breadth (see footnote 7), there is something of a 
discrepancy in the literature on whether there is a concern that memory effects might be 
related to the amount of time spent processing words. To that point are study designs 
where the structural task takes longer than the semantic task, but participants still recall 
more words from the semantic condition than the modified shallow condition.  However, 
many authors continue to treat time as a potential confound, so while a fixed presentation 
is not a necessary design feature, measuring the amount of time participants spend 
processing items (response time) is good practice.  With these considerations in mind, the 
current design was informed by the methodology outlined by Bargh and Tota (1998). 
In the current design, first the question appeared on the screen (e.g., does this word 
describe you?”), with an initial average load time of 55 milliseconds (ms). The question 
remained on the screen for 489 ms before the stimulus appeared (underneath the question). 
Both the question and stimulus remained on the screen together for an additional 489 ms 
before the response options appeared (underneath the stimulus). Participants then had a total 
of 4000 ms to indicate their response, pressing 1 for yes or 2 for no.  The total maximum 
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time for each que was approximately 5000 ms—989 ms for the cumulative interval time and 
a variable response window ranging up to 4000 ms.  In the current write up, participant 
response times do not include the interval time; that is, accrual begins when the response 
options (“press 1 for yes or 2 for no”) appear on the screen and accrual ends when the 
participant selects their response option or fails to select an option and the system times out. 
Brief Review and Aims 
The goal of the current project was to develop and refine a performance-based paradigm 
to assess identity coherence by relating self-referent memory performance to self-report 
markers of BPD features of identity disturbance.  Based on 40 years of results indicating 
that the self can serve as an active and powerful role in processing personal data, and 
going beyond previous examinations of the content of the self within groups 
conceptualized as manifesting problems in identity, the focus of the current line of inquiry 
was to examine whether individual differences in putative self-concept coherence can be 
reliably associated with differences in incidental recall, within a SR- semantic comparison 
design.  Moreover, given there is evidence of a diminished self-reference effect in groups 
conceptualized as manifesting problems in identity, such as Autism and Schizophrenia it is 
reasonable to engage the following line of inquiry:  It is to be investigated whether 
individuals elevated on BPD symptomatology, who demonstrate problematic identity 
involving a characteristic lack of sense of self, will be less likely to show the typical 
memory enhancement from self-reference judgments in a self-reference paradigm. If 
indeed there is a reduced SR Effect for people with BPD symptoms, this supports the 
contention that the structural organization hypothesized to provide the depth of processing 
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benefit identifiable for most individuals is less well- developed or articulated. In other 
words, these individuals may not show the typical SRE because of a deficit in the 
coherence of self-structure, which precludes the additional depth of processing thought to 
explain the enhanced recall. The proposed research represents an innovative first step in 
establishing the promise of this paradigm for assessing structural aspects of identity and 
self-concept 
*Note Regarding Group Formation* 
The current line of inquiry examines whether individual differences in putative self-
concept coherence can be reliably associated with differences in incidental recall 
performance, within a SR-semantic comparison design.  Self-concept coherence is here 
operationalized by the problematical identity subscale of the borderline features subscale of 
the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI-BOR-I) (for more information on the measure, 
see the Assessment section below on the PAI-BOR-I and for the items of which the 
identity subscale is comprised, see Appendix C.) The rationale for identifying differences 
in identity functioning followed from the deviation scores around the statistical mean of the 
BOR-I.  In studies utilizing the PAI-BOR for selection criteria in group formation, it is 
customary to create two groups based on normative and non- normative tscores, where 
non-normative usually refers only to elevated scores, that is, scores generally at least 1 
standard deviation above the mean are labeled “high BOR” and all other scores are labeled 
“low BOR” or “norm BOR.”  The current investigation, however, employed an exploratory 
technique by implementing two cut points, i.e., three groups were formed—a normative 
group based on scores within the standard deviation band (+1/-1), a “high BOR” group
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comprised of scores above the standard deviation band (> +1), and a “low BOR” group 
comprised of scores below the standard deviation band (< -1). More specifically, in the 
current data set, three groups were formed by implementing two “cut points” based on 
deviation scores from the mean score of a college sample (N = 222, M = 55.40, SD = 
10.99).  The finding that the mean in a college sample on BOR-I (N = 222, M = 55.40, SD = 
10.99) is roughly 5-points higher than an adult sample is thought to reflect those 
considerations outlined by Erickson and others; namely, that identity fluctuation is 
normative for a college-aged sample, as college-age is an appropriate time for self-
exploration, and the salience of these identity- related concerns are reflected by the elevated 
mean and slightly expanded deviation band (+.99).  As such, one group was formed based 
on tscores exceeding 64, which is roughly 1.5 standard deviations above community 
participant means and 1 standard deviation above the mean for a community sample (an 
adult population).  Individuals from a college-aged sample with t-scores exceeding 65, can 
be thought of as reliably elevated on indicators of problematical identity functioning (i.e., 
identity diffusion), diagnostically relevant to Borderline Personality Disorder. This group 
was labeled Diffuse Identity. A second group was formed based on t-scores representing 
non-problematical identity functioning (i.e., t-scores ranging from 46-64, or within roughly 
1 standard deviation of the mean for college-aged community participants.  This group was 
labeled Flexible Identity. Given that college is a time when identity exploration is 
normative, the rationale for identifying the third group emerged from those considerations 
highlighted by Erickson; namely, that healthy identity development requires sufficient 
Identity flexibility to confront different possible “selves,” and try out new “roles,” and
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sufficient Identity strength to experience the resulting crisis of mismatch between how one 
feels about oneself verses how one is experienced by the surrounding world, or the hopes 
and desires of the individual verses the expectations and demands of others.  Given these 
considerations, t scores indicating below average fluctuations may be suggestive of 
rigidity, or weakness, of self-structure, and if present, it stands to reason that such 
structural characteristics may alter the use of the self as a mnemonic device, and 
subsequent recall within a SRE paradigm.  As such, the current investigation explored t 
scores below 45 as an additional construct of interest.  In contrast to the diffuse and 
disorganized (high) and the normatively flexible (Norm), this group was labeled Rigid 
Identity. Appendix B provides a complete outline and rationale of the assessments proposed 
for use, and group-formation procedures intended to be employed, for future (non-pilot) 
data collection efforts.  
*Note Regarding Hypothesis 3 and 4: Time 
Mentioned above (see Method, Timing of Trials), the amount of time participant’s 
spend processing items is often treated as a potential confound that must be “dissociated” 
from the “depth” of item processing.  However, given one of the hypothesized mechanisms 
of action for the Self-Reference task is the schematic- processing ability of the Self, 
namely, to hierarchically organize and encode information based on perceived self-
relevance, the current investigation, explored processing time as a legitimate variable of 
interest –exploring whether group differences emerged in the amount of processing time 
taken (regardless of later recall), or the amount of processing time needed to facilitate later 
recall. 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Consistent with the literature on processing conditions and previous 
findings on the SRE, it was hypothesized that the number of words accurately recalled 
would differ across the three encoding conditions. Specifically, the Self- Referent 
Condition producing the highest recall, followed by the Semantic Condition, followed by 
the Shallow Condition. 
Hypothesis 2:  The SRE will differ by identity group status (Diffuse, Flexible, 
Rigid). Specifically, the (normative) Identity-Flexible group will show a larger SRE than 
the other Groups. 
Hypothesis 3: Consistent with the literature on processing conditions and previous 
findings on the SRE, it was also hypothesized that the time spent encoding words that later 
are accurately recalled would differ across the three processing conditions. 
Hypothesis 4: As a reflection of the differences in the functioning of the Self 
Structure, it was hypothesized that the amount of time needed to process words, sufficient 
to facilitate recall, would differ across the groups. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The institutional review board of Texas A&M University approved the study 
protocol, and all participants provided responses to indicate their informed consent to 
participate in the study. 
Participants 
Participants (n = 11) were recruited through the undergraduate psychology student 
subject pool at Texas A&M. All participants were informed that the experimental session 
would last approximately two hours and all participants received four research credits in 
exchange for their participation.  Informed Consent was administered by the experimenter, 
and all portions of the paradigm were administered through the computer software 
DirectRT (Jarvis, 2012).  The sample consisted of 11 people (6 females, 5 males), with an 
average age of 19 (M = 19.36, SD = 1.29). 
Assessment Materials 
Appendix B provides the complete overview of the assessment materials intended 
for use as well as their manner of use in the full design. For the current pilot investigation, 
the following subset of materials were employed, and the full sample completed only the 24 
items which comprise the Borderline Features Subscale of the PAI, as well as the 9-items 
measuring Borderline Personality Disorder pathology of the PDQ. (See Appendix C for the 
relevant items.) 
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Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). The PAI (Morey, 1991)—a 344-item self-
report inventory—provides a broad measure of psychopathology potentially relevant to the 
current study.  Participant responses are measured on a 4-point scale including “False,” 
“Not at all True,” “Mostly True,” and “Very True,” and response patterns are converted to 
t-scores (which have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10), scaled relative to 
normative and clinical population standardization data. The 24-items which comprise the 
Borderline Features (BOR) scale consists of four subscales—Affective Instability, Identity 
Disturbance, Negative Relationships, and Self-Harm.  These subscales correspond to the 
core components outlined by the DSM-IV/DSM-5-II (APA, 2000; APA, 2013). The BOR 
scale in isolation has been found to distinguish borderline patients from unscreened controls 
with an 80% hit rate, and successfully identified 91% of these subjects as part of a 
discriminant function (Bell-Pringle et al., 1997). Classifications based upon the BOR scale 
in college students have been validated in a variety of domains related to borderline 
functioning, including depression, personality traits, coping, Axis I disorders, and 
interpersonal problems (Chapman et al., 2008; Trull, 1995; Trull, Useda, Conforti, & Doan, 
1997).  Additionally, as noted by Hopwood, Zimmerman, Pincus and Kruger (2016), a 
recent study by Sharp et al. (2015) provides substantial empirical support for the longtime 
suggestion (cf., Kernberg, 1984) that DSM BPD criteria are perhaps more aptly 
conceptualized as general indicators of personality pathology (akin to g in intellectual 
functioning). 
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Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4 Borderline Personality Disorder Scale 
(PDQ-4 BPD; Hyler, 1994). The PDQ-4 is a 100-item self-report measure of DSM-IV 
personality disorders. There are nine items assessing the 9 DSM-IV/DSM-5-II criteria 
for borderline personality disorder, 8 of which are true/false and one item (measuring 
the domain of impulsivity) consists of 6 true/false sub-items, two or more of which 
must be endorsed to trigger item-level endorsement. The PDQ-BOR offers both 
categorical diagnostic utility and dimensional assessment utility. Under DSM- 
IV/DSM5, Section II guidelines, meeting criteria for BPD requires clinician- 
endorsement of 5 of the 9 criteria.  Therefore, when used as a self-report measure to 
screen individuals for the disorder, endorsement of at least 5 of the 9 items from the 
PDQ-BOR is considered suggestive of being at-risk for the disorder. As a diagnostic 
tool, the PDQ-4 has demonstrated adequate reliability and convergent validity with other 
self-report measures (e.g. Trull, Widiger, Lynam, & Costa, 2003) and structured 
interviews of BPD (Hyler, Skodol, Kellman, Oldham, & Rosnick, 1990). 
Procedure 
When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were escorted to private computer 
stations, where the experimenter took them through the process of informed consent.  
Following informed consent, an incidental recall paradigm was established by informing 
participants that the purpose of the study is to investigate the characteristics of common 
words, and that their task is to rate a set of trait adjectives. Specifically, participants were 
informed: You will be asked to rate the appearance and the meaning of approximately 60 
words.  You will also be asked to complete roughly 450 questionnaire items about
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your mood and behavior, as well as items related to your personality.  All of this will be 
completed in a single session, at a private computer.  It will take approximately two hours 
to complete, and you will be compensated with four research credits.  Participants were 
given the opportunity to ask questions, if applicable, and then the computer-administered 
portion began.  Appendix D presents the series of interactive images that were used to 
warm participants to the procedure and provide an overview of the three types of questions 
they would encounter.  Following the overview, participants were taken through a practice 
session, which included the three types of questions they would encounter; for those three 
trials (questions) all participants saw the same three stimuli (words), each paired with one 
of the cue conditions (questions); namely, one structural cue, one semantic (synonym) cue, 
and one self-referent cue. While the results of the practice sessions are recorded, they are 
not included in the final analyses, as they serve to buffer against “primacy” effects. After 
the primacy trials, all participants were exposed to 33 stimuli; the condition in which any 
particular stimuli appeared differed across participants and was determined at random (i.e., 
whether the word was presented in the self-referent, semantic or shallow conditions).   In 
response to each question, the participant indicated their response by hitting either a “1” 
for “yes” or “2” for “no.” After providing ratings for the 33 target stimuli, all participants 
were presented with the final three stimuli, which functioned as “Recency” trials, or 
“buffers.” As with the primacy trials, all participants saw the same three stimuli (words) 
paired with one structural cue, one semantic (synonym) cue, and one self-referent cue.   
Immediately after participants provided their responses for the full set of stimuli, 
participants were prompted: Please inform the experimenter that you have finished.
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At which point, the experimenter said: Thank you for your responses.  For the next 5 
minutes, please try to remember as many of the words as you can. Write down all the 
words you saw—the big green words—as many as you can remember, in the order that you 
remember them. Please continue to number the spaces for the words.  When you are 
finished, please let me know.  Each participant was then handed a sheet of paper, which 
reiterated the directions given verbally.  Following completion of the incidental free recall 
task, participants completed the battery of self-report questionnaires, including the 24 items 
from the BOR scale, which itself includes the 6 items providing a measure of problematical 
identity functioning (BOR-I).  Additionally, participants provided responses on the 9 items 
measuring Borderline Personality-pathology from the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire 
for DSM-IV (PDQ-BPD).  The battery was administered at the same computer station 
where they completed the paradigm. 
Preparing Data for Analysis 
As is customary throughout the cognitive sciences, the buffer adjectives added to 
each list to minimize primacy and recency effects upon recall were dropped prior to data 
analyses. In scoring the recall protocols for each participant, determinations regarding 
grammatical transformations (i.e., errors) were made.  For example, if the target word was 
Active, “Activ” was not considered a transformation, but “Inactive” was considered a 
transformation, and such transformations were scored as incorrect. 
To begin, the handwritten responses for each participant (recalled item sets) were 
organized with VBA variants of Excel’s conditional if-then logic statements (If/Thens) 
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and Array functions (Arrays), which perform calculations on multiple sets of values, and 
can be used to link If/Thens. First, a Vlookup array was used to cross verify the list of 
recalled words with the list of target stimuli actually shown.  If the participant’s response 
was indeed one of the target stimuli, and not a primacy or recency item, the Vlookup 
returned a table with the following values: the recalled word in the form it appeared to the 
participant, the condition the word appeared within (Self, Semantic, or Structural), the 
participant’s indicated response (yes or no), the response time (understood as the amount of 
time which elapsed between when the stimulus appeared on the screen and when the 
participant provided their response by hitting the number one or number two key on the 
keyboard), as well as additional measures not central to the current investigation.  
Proportions were calculated for the number of words recalled, relative to the total number.  
For example, in the Self Condition, participants are asked “Does this word describe you?” 
and participants respond either Yes or No.  The total number of times the participant says 
yes to the question “Does this word describe you?” serves as the denominator, and the 
numerator consists only of those words which are later correctly recalled by the participant 
when answering yes to the question “Does this word describe you?” This resulted in 6 
conditions, namely, Self-Yes, Self-No, Semantic-Yes, Semantic-No, Structural-Yes, 
Structural-No.  Next If/Thens were used to collect and average participant response times, 
across all six conditions. One set of response times was calculated for the average 
processing time regardless of later recall and another set was calculated for the average 
processing time only for words later accurately recalled. 
Notably, to calculate the Self-Reference Effect, the proportion of words accurately 
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recalled Semantic Processing condition was subtracted from the proportion of words 
accurately recalled in the Self-Referent condition. 
Groups 
The current line of inquiry examines whether individual differences in putative self-
concept coherence can be reliably associated with differences in incidental recall 
performance, within a SR-semantic comparison design.  Self-concept coherence is here 
operationalized by the PAI-BOR-I, and the rationale for identifying differences in identity 
functioning followed from the deviation scores around the statistical mean of the BOR-I.  
Specifically two “cut points” were made, serving to demarcate three groups. 
These cut points were roughly grouped based on deviation from the mean score in a 
college sample.  The finding that the mean in a college sample on BOR-I (N = 222, M = 
55.40, SD = 10.99) is roughly 5-points higher than an adult sample is thought to reflect 
those considerations outlined by Erickson and others; namely, that the nature of identity 
fluctuation is normative for a college-aged sample, as college-age is an appropriate time 
for self-exploration, and the salience of these identity-related concerns are reflected by the 
elevated mean and expanded deviation band.  One group was formed based on tscores 
exceeding 64, which is roughly 1.5 standard deviations above community participant 
means and 1 standard deviation above the mean for a college-aged community sample.  
Individuals from a college-aged sample with t-scores exceeding 65, can be thought of as 
reliably elevated on indicators of problematical identity functioning (i.e., identity 
diffusion), diagnostically relevant to Borderline Personality Disorder.  This group was 
labeled Diffuse Identity.  A second group was formed based on t-scores 
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representing non-problematical identity functioning (i.e., t-scores ranging from 46-64, or 
within roughly 1 standard deviation of the mean for college-aged community participants.  
This group was labeled Flexible Identity.   As t-scores indicative of below average 
fluctuations in identity may be suggestive of a restriction in the range of self exploration, a 
third group was identified based on t-scores below 45, to investigate excessive structural 
rigidity as an additional classification of problematical identity. This group was labeled 
Rigid Identity. 
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RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
An overview of symptom-relevant participant characteristics is presented in Table 
6. A cursory examination of participant performance by gender suggested that of the four 
BOR subscales, endorsement rates across gender were only significantly different on 
measures of negative affect (BOR-N) t(9)= -2.68, p = .025, η2 = .44, with women (n = 6) 
(M = 64.00, SD = 9.70), endorsing higher levels than men (Mmen = 50.00, SD =7.33). 
Word Recall 
Table 7 presents the bivariate correlations for the community-normed T Scores of 
the BOR and BOR-I with Word Recall, for the Self-Referent, Semantic, and Shallow 
Conditions, broken down by Yes/No responses.  While none of the correlations reached 
statistical significance, the lack of significance is difficult to interpret given the sample 
size (N = 11). The strongest relationships with the identity subscale were with 
unanticipated variables.  The relationships for BOR-I with Semantic-No  (r = -.38) and 
Yes conditions (r = .28) was stronger than the corresponding relationships with the overall 
Borderline Scale (No r = -.19; Yes r = .18). As mentioned above, BOR-I is one of the 4 
subscales of BOR, and so any correlations with the identity subscale larger than the 
borderline scale would suggest that, of the array of symptomatology captured by BOR, it 
is likely the identity component driving the relationship. Although small, these findings 
provide the first suggestion of a unique relationship between identity functioning and 
behavioral performance on a Self-Reference task. 
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As shown in Table 7, there is a pattern of positive and negative r-values across the 
Yes and No subgroups, in the Semantic/Structural Conditions, respectively, that may 
artificially be reducing the appearance of a relationship when forming the Composite 
Conditions. While the identical pattern is not seen with the Self-Yes (r = -.08) and Self- 
No conditions (r = -.19), the finding that the strength of the relationship between the 
identity subscale and the composite Self-Reference Condition (r = -.07) is even smaller 
than either of the sub-conditions of which it is entirely comprised would suggest that this 
same pattern may indeed be present. 
To examine word recall, 3X3 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)12 was 
conducted, with identity group (Diffuse, Flexible, Rigid) as the between-subjects factor, and 
task condition (Self-Referent, Semantic, Shallow) as the within-subjects factor. Consistent 
with hypothesis 1, there was a main effect of Condition on the proportion of words recalled, 
F(1, 10) = 21.80, p = .002; ηp2 = .73, indicating there was indeed a memory effect generated 
by the paradigm, and the observed power to detect this effect was .98. 
 
 
12 Technically, this a repeat measures or a “time series” design, which begins at the level of examining 
whether there are group differences in performance across the three conditions (the “time” element). Given 
the design, the main effect of “time” is technically a within-subjects contrast, addressing whether the scores 
of the groups differ across the conditions. The interaction term then addresses whether the groups progress 
at different rates “over time” (i.e., across the three conditions)—that is, do the groups differentially differ 
across conditions. 
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p 
Table 8 presents details on the average recall generated by the three conditions. As shown 
in Table 8, recall was highest for words processed in the Self-Referent Condition (M = .38, 
SD =.14), compared to the Semantic (Δμ = .10, p = .034)13 and Shallow Condition (Δμ = 
.27, p = .002). Recall for words processed in the Semantic Condition (M = .28, SD =.09) 
was also higher than recall for words processed in the Shallow Condition (Δμ = .17, p = 
.002). These findings provide support for hypothesis 1 that the number of words accurately 
recalled would differ across the three encoding conditions, with the Self-Referent 
Condition producing the highest recall, followed by the Semantic Condition, followed by 
the Shallow Condition.  Moreover, these findings are consistent with the literature on 
processing conditions and previous findings on the SRE. 
The interaction between identity-group and task condition was not significant 
F(2, 10) = .60, p = .574; η 2 = .13.  However, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 10, the Self-
Reference Effect was greater for the Flexible Identity (normative) group (Δμ = . 12, 
p = .061) than for the Rigid  (Δμ = .10, p = .188) or Diffuse groups (Δμ = .07, p = .351) 
(see also Table 11), and despite the small sample size, approached significance only for 
the Flexible Identity (normative) group (Δμ = .12, p = .061, HedgesGav=1.12, CL ES = 
.86) . These findings provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 2 and underscore the 
potential utility of an SR-Semantic paradigm for use as a behavioral indicator of identity 
functioning. 
 
 
13 This is the overall Self-Referent Effect. 
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The Effect of Yes and No 
Following Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977), it is not uncommon for investigations 
of the Self-Reference Effect to consider the effect of Yes and No responses on subsequent 
recall.  In the present investigation, these analyses would have been premature, given the 
small sample and missing data for entire categories.  In lieu of full analyses, a table of 
effect sizes for mean differences is presented in Table 12 and Figure 2. 
Response Time 
Table 13 presents the bivariate correlations for the BOR and BOR-I Scales of the 
PAI (normed t-scores) with participants’ average overall processing time, and Table 14 
presents the bivariate correlations for the same PAI scales with participants’ average 
processing time on accurately recalled items. Across both tables, the absolute values for the 
full range of r extend from .01 to .51 for BOR (overall M r = .24, Median r = .25) and .05 
to .55 for BOR-I (overall M r = .26; Median r = .23). There appears to be stronger 
relationship between the identity subscale and the average processing time on accurately 
recalled items (Table 14: Identity M r = .32), than with the overall processing time (Table 
13: Identity M r = .20). One possible interpretation of this finding is that there are 
differences in the amount of time needed to process items that are later accurately recalled, 
based on standing on BOR-I. The strongest relationship, however, with the identity 
subscale is with the Overall Time and Self-No r = -.55, p = .077, which, in addition to 
approaching significance, demonstrates a stronger relationship than the corresponding r for 
the Borderline scale r = -.51, p = .108. 
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p 
One possible interpretation of this finding is that higher levels of identity diffusion are 
associated with quicker processing times when deciding that an item is not self-referent. 
Given the previously described relationship between BOR and BOR-I, these findings 
would suggest that, of the array of symptomatology captured by the PAI, the association 
here suggested between quicker processing times and No-responses on the self-referent 
task are likely driven by the identity component.14 
An analysis of the time spent considering words that were later recalled was 
conducted with a mixed ANOVA, with identity group (Diffuse, Flexible, Rigid) as the 
between-subjects factor , and task condition (Self-Referent Time, Semantic Time, 
Shallow Time) as the between-subjects factor.  Mauchly’s test of the homogeneity of 
variance approached significance (p = .095).  There was a significant main effect 
(quadratic) of task condition F(1, 10) = 9.011, p = .017, η 2  =.53. Participants spent 
more time processing words in the Semantic Condition than in the Self (Δμ = 669.44, p 
= .012) or Shallow Conditions (Δμ = 775.68, p = .027). Participants spent roughly 
equivalent amounts of time (Δμ = 106.23, p = .509) in the Self (M = 1010.27, SD = 
612.08) and Shallow Conditions (M = 1065.52, SD = 486.73). As such, Hypothesis 3 
was not supported.  There was a marginally significant linear trend for the interaction 
 
 
14 Additional data would be useful for examining the relationship between time spent and actual words 
recalled, to examine whether it was merely the case that less time was spent, potentially implying a kind of 
dismissiveness of self-relevance; or whether less time was needed, potentially implying the presence of an 
increased familiarity with what or who one is not, rather than who or what one is.
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p between task condition and group, F(2, 10) = 3.36, p = .087; η 2  = .457.  Table 16 
presents effect sizes for the differences between the groups’ response times across the 
three conditions, where, notably, there is a trend in the Self Condition, contrasting the 
Flexible with the Diffuse group  (Δμ = 633.17, p = .088) and in the Shallow Condition 
there is a reliable difference contrasting the Flexible with the Rigid group (Δμ = 983.92, p 
= .022).  An initial observation is that where the Conditions do not reliably differ is where 
the groups are trending and/or do reliably differ (Flexible and Diffuse in the Self 
Condition) and (Flexible and Rigid in the Shallow condition). The meaningfulness of this 
is that in a time series design the usual analysis of interest is whether group scores change 
over time (i.e., across conditions).  In the current investigation, the analysis of interest is 
whether the “condition scores” change as a function of the group differences—that is, 
whether the deviation in the group’s scores is large enough to, essentially, equate response 
times that would otherwise be different. Here, the Self and Shallow Conditions—
Conditions that would normally be expected to diverge—are roughly equivalent. This 
suggests that individual differences in identity functioning may be a notable factor in how 
the groups approach the Self and Shallow tasks (as measured by processing time). More 
specifically regarding the direction of the outlined group differences, although statistical 
significance varied, the Diffuse identity group spent less time processing words later 
recalled in the Self Condition than either the Flexible (Δμ = -633.17, p = .088)
or Rigid groups (Δμ = -510.41, p = .198). Moreover, the Diffuse group spent less time in 
the Self Condition than in the Semantic15   (Δμ = -1327.37, p = .009) or Shallow Conditions 
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(Δμ = -194.15, p = .516). Contrasting these findings (regarding time spent) with the 
amount of words actually recalled, the relative patterns of difference between group 
performance are contrasted by comparing Table 16 (group differences in words recalled, 
within conditions) with the current set (group differences in times for those recalled 
words). 
In the Self-Referent Condition, the Flexible group remembered approximately .5 
standard deviation more words than either the Diffuse or Rigid Groups (ds=.47; ds=.50, 
respectively), and the Diffuse and Rigid Groups were not appreciably different in recall 
(ds=.03). The Flexible group, however, spent nearly 1.5 standard deviations more time 
(ds=1.43) than the Diffuse group to recall .5 standard deviations more words (ds=0.47), and 
the Rigid group also spent nearly 1.5 standard deviations more time (ds=1.41) than the 
Diffuse group to recall slightly more words (ds=.03). While in all three cases, the groups 
roughly remember more words where they have spent more time, the suggested difference 
is in the relative amount of time spent on those words that are later recalled— as one might 
expect a greater “efficiency” in recall (i.e., more words in proportionally less time) for 
groups considered higher on functioning.  While this pattern of findings certainly requires 
further testing with a larger sample, one potentially confounding 
 
 
15 The most straightforward reason that the semantic condition would take longer to process is that the 
condition has a confound which has not been addressed by the literature—or is at least not a matter of common 
discussion, and to our knowledge the methodological implications of which have not been addressed, which 
are, namely: In the Semantic Condition, where one word is being compared to another, there are twice as many 
words to process as there are for the Self and Shallow-Conditions. 
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variable which will need to be measured and/or controlled for in any future examination, 
is the amount of time participants spent actually recalling the words (i.e. writing them 
down), which was not specifically recorded in the current (pilot) investigation, and which 
appeared to differ, in some instances notably, across participant
 63 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
The current project aimed to establish and refine a behavioral indicator of the 
coherence of personality structure, utilizing a cognitive paradigm theorized to tap the self-
system—the Self Reference Effect.  In the current investigation, the potential utility of this 
effect in identifying identity dysregulation was piloted. The preliminary findings 
suggested a pattern of enhanced performance for the normative identity group, who 
appeared to demonstrate a stronger mnemonic effect from the use of their self as an 
encoding strategy, relative to the two groups self-reporting indicators of problematical 
functioning. For the two problematical identity functioning groups, the use of the self does 
not appear to be as effective of a mnemonic device. 
More specifically, the study design employed a self-referent paradigm, which 
contrasted a self-referent condition (i.e., does this word describe you?”) against a semantic 
(synonym) control condition (i.e., “does this word mean the same as another word?”).   
The Self-Reference Effect was calculated as the difference in the words accurately recalled 
in the self-referent verses the semantic conditions.  Identity dysregulation was measured by 
the identity subscale of the Borderline Features Scale of the PAI. Two cut points were 
made along this dimensional indicator of problematical identity functioning, which 
identified a normative group, an elevated group—considered informative of borderline 
personality symptomatology, and an exploratory group—self-reporting as markedly low on 
problematical identity functioning, and which, to our knowledge, is the first such
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investigation with the PAI. Both word recall as well as response time were investigated 
across the three groups. 
Regarding word recall, there is meta-analytically supported difference in word 
recall between the Self-Referent, Semantic, and Shallow conditions, where the different 
degrees of recall resulting from consideration of personal meaningfulness (Self), above 
general meaningfulness (Semantic), above “mere” reference (Shallow) are thought to relate 
to general meaningful, but also to personal meaningfulness—that is, the degree to which 
they tap the self.   The preliminary findings suggested a pattern of enhanced performance 
for the normative identity group, who appeared to demonstrate a stronger mnemonic effect 
from the use of their self as an encoding strategy, relative to the two groups self-reporting 
indicators of problematical functioning; for the two problematical identity functioning 
groups, the use of the self does not appear to be as effective of a mnemonic device.  The 
preliminary findings suggest that the self-reference effect (word recall in the Self minus 
Semantic Conditions) may be useful as an indicator of identity functioning. 
While previous investigations have examined individual differences within a Self-
Referent/Semantic paradigm, to our knowledge, participant response time has not been 
explored. Time spent processing items is often treated as a potential confound that 
must be “dissociated” from the “depth” of item processing.  The current investigation 
explored whether putative differences could be reliably tied to performance within a 
self-reference paradigm, and given one of the hypothesized mechanisms of action for the 
Self-Reference task is the schematic-processing ability of the Self, namely, to
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hierarchically organize and encode information based on perceived self-relevance, it was 
investigated whether differences would emerge in the approach taken to the conditions, 
based on identity functioning, or whether there were differences in the amount of time that 
was needed to process words in order to later recall them.   Here, the preliminary findings 
also suggested that response time may be informative. 
As noted by Kauffman (2014), although initial formation of identity largely takes 
place in youth, identity development is a lifelong task, and a basic understanding of 
development is required to distinguish pathological identity problems from normative 
identity confusion (Marcia, 2006).  Kernberg claims (2004), that “the key anchoring point 
of the differential diagnosis of milder types of character pathology and neurotic personality 
organization, on the one hand, and severe character pathology and borderline personality 
on the other, is the presence of normal identity integration as opposed to the syndrome of 
identity diffusion.”  In demonstrating the utility of the Alternative Model to diagnose 
identity dysfunction in adolescents, Schmeck at al. (2015) note that identity diffusion is not 
just a symptom of BPD, but is one of the central features of all personality disorders.  
These points serve to highlight the importance of measuring identity—often considered an 
element of normative development—within a psychopathological framework. To go 
beyond a merely psychopathological framework, a common framework could improve 
identity-related research (Kauffman, et al., 2014), thereby providing additional 
developmental and clinical utility. As noted by Kerr, et al. (2015), if a clearer concept of 
the self were to emerge, disorders such as BPD could be reframed as pervasive and 
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complex disorders of the structure and function of the self; moreover, such an approach 
would be inherently dimensional and trans-diagnostic (cf. social-neurocognitive research 
(e.g., see Murray, Schaer, & Debbané, 2012), with application for clinical assessment and 
intervention. A number of theorists are inclined toward the view that the models of 
borderline pathology serve as prototypes for more general models of personality pathology 
(for example, see Clarkin et al., 2007 or Hopwood et al., 2015), and moreover, that 
borderline personality is not a single diagnostic construct, per se, but rather a stage of 
personality development common to all individuals (for a discussion within an object-
relations model, see Horner, 1995a; Horner, 1995b).  Such a view might explain findings 
from a review carried out by Adshead and Fonagy (2012), suggesting that disorders of self-
experience are common to many psychiatric disorders, and going so far as to suggest that 
perhaps the reason that psychological therapies “work” on those disorders is that they work 
on the self. Toward that end, this project serves to pilot for refinement a behavioral 
indicator of the coherence of identity structure, hypothetically correlated with Self and 
Identity functioning.  The preliminary findings suggest that the self-reference effect (word 
recall in the Self minus Semantic Conditions) may be useful as an indicator of identity 
functioning.  The preliminary findings also suggest that response time may be informative 
as well.  While an obvious limitation in the present investigation was its sample size, the 
pattern of results appears sufficiently promising so as to warrant further study of the SRE 
for measuring identity diffusion as it relates to borderline personality functioning, 
specifically, as well as the broader aim of contributing to the measurement of identity 
functioning.
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES 
Table 1 
Levels of Processing, Cue Questions and Associated 
 Responses: Rogers, et al., 1977, Experiment 1  
Cue Answer 
Level of 
Processing Question Yes No Manipulation 
Either same size type or 
Structural Big letters? twice as large 
Phonemic Rhymes with? Either rhymed or did not 
Semantic 
(Synonym) Means the same as? Synonym or not 
Self (Descriptive) Describes you? Participant-Determined 
85 
Table 2 
Typical Questions and Associated Responses from Craik and Tulving (1975) 
Answer 
Level of processing Question Yes No 
Structural Is the word in capital letters? TABLE Table 
Phonemic Does the word rhyme with WEIGHT? Crate Market 
Category Is the word a type of fish? Shark Heaven 
Sentence Would the word fit the sentence: Friend Cloud 
He met a in the street? 
Source: Craik, F. I., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the retention of 
words in episodic memory.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 104(3), 268. 
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Table 3 
Incidental Recall of Descriptive Self-Referent and Semantic Control Conditions 
 d lower upper Self Sym ML TOP PT TET TAR Test Dist DV N 
Register & Kihlstrom (1987) 1.61 1.11 2.12 Desc Syn 64 Item UJ 0 5 Incid Ab Recall 40 
Kendzierski (1980) 1.01 0.49 1.53 Desc Syn 47 Item UL 0 UL Incid Ab Recall 32 
Klein & Kihlstrom (1986 Exp 1) 0.99 0.36 1.62 Desc Syn 54 Item UL 1 5 Incid Ab Recall 22 
Rogers et al. (1977 Exp 1) 0.98 0.46 1.5 Desc Syn 48 Item UL 0 3 Incid Ab Recall 32 
Katz (1987) 0.98 0.69 1.27 Desc Syn 84 Item UJ 20 UL Incid Pr Recall 103 
Sutton et al. (1988) 0.73 0.25 1.2 Desc Syn 60 Item UL 2 3 Incid Pr Recall 36 
Pullyblank et al. (1985, Exp 1) 0.58 -0.12 1.29 Desc Syn 16 Item UJ 1 UL Incid Pr Recall 16 
Pullyblank et al. (1985, Exp 2) 0.47 0.07 0.88 Desc Syn 16 Item UJ 1 UL Incid Pr Recall 48 
Average 0.919 0.414 1.426   49        41 
Note. Effect sizes are positive for memory differences in the direction of the SR group. Ab= absent; Desc= descriptive;  DV=Dependent Variable; 
Incid=incidental;  Item= item specific; ML= memory load  (in number of words); Pr = present;  PT  = presentation time (in seconds);  Recall = free 
recall;  Syn = synonym;  TAR = time allowed for recall (in  min);  TET = time between encoding and memory test  (in  min);   ToP = type of 
processing;  UJ  = unable to judge; UL = unlimited time for  recall. 
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Table 4 
Proposed Stimuli: Trials, Buffers, Self-Referent Targets, Synonyms, Unrelated 
  Adjectives and Structural Variants   
Target Synonym Unrelated STRUCTURAL Structural Function 
Meditative Calm Mathematical MEDITATIVE Meditative Trial 
Lucky Fortunate Mathematical LUCKY Lucky Trial 
Entertaining Thrilling Mathematical ENTERTAINING Entertaining Trial 
Fashionable Trendy Numerical FASHIONABLE Fashionable Buffer 
Comical Funny Numerical COMICAL Comical Buffer 
Able Competent Numerical ABLE Able Buffer 
Unartistic Uncreative Gutsy UNARTISTIC Unartistic Neg 
Bossy Pushy Cosmopolitan BOSSY Bossy Neg 
Domineering Overbearing Cunning DOMINEERING Domineering Neg 
Withdrawn Retreated Inquiring WITHDRAWN Withdrawn Neg 
Show-off Exhibitionist Traditional SHOW-OFF Show-off Neg 
Inhibited Constrained Illiterate INHIBITED Inhibited Neg 
Noisy Boisterous Ignorant NOISY Noisy Neg 
Forceless Powerless Analytical FORCELESS Forceless Neg 
Forceful Commanding Dense FORCEFUL Forceful Neg 
*Active Lively Cerebral ACTIVE Active Neut 
Energetic Spirited Contemplative ENERGETIC Energetic Neut 
Outspoken Vocal Talented OUTSPOKEN Outspoken Neut 
Talkative Chatty Atypical TALKATIVE Talkative Neut 
Simple Straightforward Boisterous SIMPLE Simple Neut 
Bright Smart Muted BRIGHT Bright Neut 
Broad-minded Cosmopolitan Restrained BROAD-MINDED Broad-minded Neut 
Civilized* Cultured Sheepish CIVILIZED* Civilized* Neut 
Curious Exploring Noiseless CURIOUS Curious Neut 
Wise Enlightened Retreated WISE Wise Neut 
Sophisticated Refined Reclusive SOPHISTICATED Sophisticated Neut 
Unconventional Atypical Constrained UNCONVENTIONAL Unconventional Neut 
Inventive Innovative Feeble INVENTIVE Inventive Neut 
Inquisitive Interested Coy INQUISITIVE Inquisitive Neut 
Clever Astute Prudent CLEVER Clever Neut 
Artistic Crafty Submissive ARTISTIC Artistic Neut 
Creative Resourceful* Powerless CREATIVE Creative Neut 
Logical* Rational Afraid LOGICAL* Logical* Neut 
Reflective Thoughtful Fearless REFLECTIVE Reflective Neut 
Enthusiastic Expressive Knowledgeable ENTHUSIASTIC Enthusiastic Neut 
Sociable Friendly Scholarly SOCIABLE Sociable Neut 
Outgoing Gregarious Rational OUTGOING Outgoing Neut 
*Adventurous Brave Unreasonable ADVENTUROUS Adventurous Neut 
Social Extraverted Straightforward SOCIAL Social Neut 
Individualistic unique Lively INDIVIDUALISTIC Individualistic Neut 
Imaginative Open Vocal IMAGINATIVE Imaginative Neut 
Philosophical Semantic Confident PHILOSOPHICAL Philosophical Neut 
Intelligent Sharp Courageous INTELLIGENT Intelligent Neut 
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Intellectual Scholarly Pushy INTELLECTUAL Intellectual Neut 
Questioning Inquiring Overbearing QUESTIONING Questioning Neut 
Conventional Traditional Evident CONVENTIONAL Conventional Neut 
*Bold Courageous Smart BOLD Bold Neut 
Daring Gutsy Cultured DARING Daring Neut 
Firm Unshakable Visionary FIRM Firm Neut 
Timid Sheepish Thoughtful TIMID Timid Neut 
Unaggressive Gentle Uncreative UNAGGRESSIVE Unaggressive Neut 
Assertive Confident innovative ASSERTIVE Assertive Neut 
Shy Hesitant Refined SHY Shy Neut 
Persistent Determined Indifferent PERSISTENT Persistent Neut 
Reserved Restrained Customary RESERVED Reserved Neut 
Quiet Silent Narrow interests QUIET Quiet Neut 
Unadventurous careful Dim UNADVENTUROUS Unadventurous Neut 
Righteous Virtuous Contemporary RIGHTEOUS Righteous Buffer 
Romantic Amorous Contemporary ROMANTIC Romantic Buffer 
Skilled Gifted Contemporary SKILLED Skilled Buffer 
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Table 5 
Example Affect, Likeability and Meaningfulness Ratings for a Sample List of Proposed Target Words 
ANEW (Rated 1-9) Anderson  (Rated 0-6) Valence Arousal Dominance Word Likeability Mean 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Freq. Mean (SD) Ranked 
Active 455 0.65 356 
Adventurous 441 0.9 350 
Artistic 400 1.58 348 
Bold 6.8 -1.61 5.6 -2.21 6.67 -1.81 21 336 1.22 366 
Bright 7.5 -1.55 5.4 -2.33 6.34 -1.82 87 483 0.67 362 
Clever 496 0.56 370 
CONVENTIONAL 260 0.95 322 
CREATIVE 462 1.15 366 
Curious 5.02 -2.02 6.38 -1.78 4.93 -1.76 6 432 1.13 372 
Daring 360 1.03 358 
Enthusiastic 489 0.72 382 
FIRM #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Inquisitive 225 0.94 358 
Intelligent 537 0.62 368 
Inventive 453 0.86 356 
Logical 465 0.76 370 
Outgoing 412 1.46 364 
OUTSPOKEN 313 1.77 362 
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Persistent 347 1.66 382 
Philosophical 386 1.78 326 
Questioning #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Quiet 5.58 -1.83 2.82 -2.13 4.42 -2.3 76 311 0.91 376 
RESERVED 4.88 -1.83 3.27 -2.05 4.3 -1.93 27 348 1 356 
Shy 4.64 -1.83 3.77 -2.29 3.44 -1.96 13 291 0.89 376 
Sociable 6.88 -1.82 4.98 -2.59 5.91 -2.07 380 429 0.85 360 
Social 398 1.05 338 
Sophisticated 372 0.95 332 
Talkative 352 1.32 390 
UNADVENTUROUS 212 0.93 356 
Unaggressive 304 1.43 372 
Unconventional 346 0.92 344 
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Table 6 
Identity Group Standing on Borderline Personality Symptomatology as Measured by the PAI 
BOR 42.33 4.04 2.33 40.00 60.40 5.86 2.62 59.00 69.00 7.21 4.16 67.00 57.82 11.84 3.57 59.00 
BOR-I 41.00 0.00 0.00 41.00 57.20 1.64 0.74 56.00 72.00 7.55 4.36 71.00 56.82 12.52 3.78 56.00 
BOR-S 46.33 8.33 4.81 49.00 59.60 11.67 5.22 60.00 59.00 1.73 1.00 60.00 55.82 10.30 3.11 57.00 
BOR-N 46.33 5.77 3.33 43.00 64.20 9.93 4.44 59.00 59.00 9.00 5.20 59.00 57.91 11.08 3.34 56.00 
BOR-A 42.00 5.20 3.00 39.00 51.40 5.59 2.50 50.00 65.00 2.65 1.53 64.00 52.55 9.99 3.01 50.00 
Combined N = 11; Rigid Identity Group n = 3; Flexible Identity Group n = 5; Diffuse Identity Group n = 3 
Rigid Identity Group Flexible Identity Group Diffuse Identity Group Combined Identity Groups 
M SD SE Med M SD SE Med M SD SE Med M SD SE Med 
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Table 7 
Correlations for the PAI Borderline Scale and Identity Subscale with the Proportion of Words Recalled across Processing Conditions 
  
 
Self 
 
 
Semantic 
 
 
Shallow 
 
Self 
Yes 
 
Self 
No 
 
Semantic 
Yes 
 
Semantic 
No 
 
Shallow 
Yes 
 
Shallow 
No 
Borderline Scale -0.19 -0.04 0.47 -0.09 -0.35 0.16 -0.19 -0.46 0.47 
Identity Subscale -0.07 -0.05 0.19 -0.08 -0.19 0.28 -0.38 -0.34 0.26 
Note. None of the correlations presented reached statistical significance. The Borderline Scale includes the Identity Subscale. 
N = 11 
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Table 8 
Means and Effect Size Estimates for Memory Effect Generated by the Three Conditions:  Group Grand Means 
Group 
Memory Effect by Condition 
μΔ μΔ      ds CL ES 
Condition 
Mean of All 
Groups 
Self 0.37 
Semantic .27* .1 1.85 .91 
Shallow .11* .26 3.40 .99 
Semantic Shallow -.16* 3.85 .99 
Note. To calculate effect sizes, t values were derived from the mean differences and then divided by the standard errors of those differences.  
To aid interpretation of these differences, Table 8 presents also presents a common language effect size (CL ES) (Lakens, 2013; McGraw and 
Wong, 1992), which essentially converts the relevant Cohen's d statistic into a probability (or percent likelihood).   
* p < .05
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Table 9 
Effect Size Estimates1 Contrasting Group’s Word Recall Performance Within Conditions  
Condition 
Identity Group Means 
μΔ μΔ      ds 
CL Effect 
Size 
Self 
Flexible 0.42 
Rigid .35 .07 .50 .63 
Diffuse .35 .07 .47 .62 
Diffuse Rigid .01 .03 .51 
Semantic 
Flexible .30 
Rigid .24 .06 .74 .70 
Diffuse .28 .02 .16 .54 
Diffuse Rigid .04 .33 .59 
Shallow 
Flexible .17 
Rigid .06 .12 1.64 .89 
Diffuse .09 .08 1.24 .84 
Diffuse Rigid
*
.04 .94 .75 
* 
p
 
< .05 
CL ES is a Common Language Effect Size, which can be calculated directly from Cohen's d, converts the effect size into a percentage.  For between 
subjects designs, and expresses the probability that a randomly sampled person from one group will have a higher observed measurement than a 
randomly sampled person from the other group.  
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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Table 10 
Effect Size Estimate1 Contrasting Group Performance Across the Self and Semantic Conditions 
Effect Condition Recall SRE 
Cohens 
dav 
Hedges 
GAV 
CL Effect 
Siz
μSelf μSemantic Δ μSelf-μSemantic 
Rigid Self .35 Semantic .24 .11 .77 .66 .74a 
Flexible Self .42 Semantic .30 .12† 1.24 1.12 .86a 
Diffuse Self .35 Semantic .28 .07 .44 .36 .64a 
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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Table 11 
Mean and Effect Size Estimates1 for the Contrasts of Group's Self-Reference Effects 
Effect SRE Scores SRE Contrasts ds CL ES 
Δ μSelf- μSemantic Group Δ SRE / SRE 
SRE Flexible .12 
Rigid .11 .01 .16 .54 
Diffuse .07 .05 .47 .62 
Diffuse Rigid .04 .25 .57 
CL ES is a Common Language Effect Size, which can be calculated directly from Cohen's d, converts the effect size into a percentage. For 
between subjects designs, and expresses the probability that a randomly sampled person from one group will have a higher observed measurement 
than a randomly sampled person from the other group. 
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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Table 12 
Effect Size Estimates1 Contrasting Groups’ Word Recall Within Sub-Composite Conditions 
Condition 
Identity Group Means μΔ μΔ ds CL ES 
Self Yes 
Flexible .40 
Rigid .32 .09 .38 .6 
Diffuse .32 .08 .61 .68 
Diffuse Rigid -.01 .06 .52 
Self No 
Flexible 
Rigid .42 .10 .5 .65 
.52 
Diffuse .39 .13 .48 .62 
Diffuse Rigid -.028 .11 .53 
Semantic 
Yes 
Flexible 
Rigid . .50 1.53 .89 
.47 
Diffuse .17 .30 .87 .74 
Diffuse Rigid .167 .82 .72 
Semantic 
No 
Flexible 
Rigid .31 -.10 .79 .72 
.21 
Diffuse .19 .02 .11 .53 
Diffuse Rigid -.128 .85 .73 
Shallow 
Yes 
Flexible 
Rigid .26 -.18 .84 .69 
.08 
Diffuse .11 -.03 .46 .62 
Diffuse Rigid -.142 .54 .65 
Shallow 
No 
Flexible 
Rigid . .42 1.37 .87 
.42 
Diffuse .29 .13 .33 .59 
Diffuse Rigid .29 1.03 .77 
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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Table 13 
Bivariate Correlations for Overall Response Times, Independent of Word 
Recall, by Condition, with PAI scales  
Self Self Semantic Semantic Shallow   Shallow 
Identity r 
Yes 
-0.15 
No 
-0.55 
Yes 
-0.05 
No 
-0.08 
Yes 
-0.12 
No 
0.23 
Subscale p 0.66 0.08 0.88 0.82 0.72 0.50 
n 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Borderline r -0.04 -0.51 0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.25 
Scale p 0.90 0.11 0.81 0.97 0.71 0.46 
n 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Note. Sample sizes and p values are provided by condition, as word recall varies. 
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Table 14 
Bivariate Correlations for Response Times for Accurately Recalled Words, by 
Condition, with PAI scales  
Self 
Yes 
Self 
No 
Semantic 
Yes 
Semantic 
No 
Shallow 
Yes 
Shallow 
No 
Identity r -0.30 -0.39 0.24 0.32 -0.17 0.47 
Subscale p 0.37 0.27 0.65 0.40 0.74 0.28 
n 11 10 6 9 6 7 
Borderline r -0.27 -0.42 0.23 0.34 -0.24 0.36 
Scale p 0.43 0.23 0.66 0.37 0.64 0.43 
n 11 10 6 9 6 7 
Note. Sample sizes and p values are provided by condition, as word recall varies. 
100 
Table 15 
Effect Size Estimates1 Contrasting Groups’ Recall Time Within Sub-Composite Conditions 
Condition 
Identity Group Means μΔ μΔ ds 
CL 
Effect 
Size 
Self Yes Flexible 1142.52     
Rigid 839.33 303.18 1.04 .76 
Diffuse Rigid -207.94 .66 .68 
Self No Flexible 1400.87     
Rigid 1458.50 -57.63 .08 .52 
Diffuse 735.20 665.67 .94 .79 
Diffuse Rigid -723.30 1.34 .86 
Semantic 
Yes 
Flexible 1673.54     Rigid 1431.50 242.04 .35 .64 Diffuse 2182.00 -508.46 .73 .77 
Diffuse Rigid 750.50 - - 
Semantic 
No 
Flexible 2005.05     Rigid 1250.09 754.97 .94 .79 Diffuse 2075.11 -70.06 .07 .52 
Diffuse Rigid 825.03 .82 .75 
Shallow 
Yes 
Flexible 1206.33     Rigid 314.00 892.33 1.14 .87 Diffuse 467.50 738.83 1.08 .8 
Diffuse Rigid 153.50 .43 .67 
Shallow 
No 
Flexible 1674.30     Rigid 949.25 725.05 .84 .75 Diffuse 1563.00 111.30 .12 .55 
Diffuse Rigid 613.75 1.11 .87 
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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Table 16 
Effect Size Estimates1 Contrasting Groups’ Recall Time Within  Composite Conditions 
Condition 
Identity Group Means μΔ μΔ ds 
CL 
Effect 
Size
Self 
Flexible 
Rigid 
1271.69 
Diffuse 
1148.92 
638.51 
122.77 
633.18† 
.25 
1.43 
.57 
.87 
Diffuse Rigid 510. 41 1.41 .84 
Semantic 
Flexible 
Rigid
1791.01 
Diffuse 
1310.56 
1965.89 
480.45 
-174.88 
.97 
.23 
.75 
.55 
Diffuse Rigid -655.33 .81 .72 
Shallow 
Flexible 
Rigid
1445.84 
Diffuse 
461.92 
832.67 
983.92* 
613.17 
2.57 
1.25 
9.6 
.79 
Diffuse Rigid -370.75 .65 .68 
*p < .05
† 
p = .08
CL ES is a Common Language Effect Size, which can be calculated directly from Cohen's d, converts the effect size into a percentage.  For between 
subjects designs, and expresses the probability that a randomly sampled person from one group will have a higher observed measurement than a 
randomly sampled person from the other group.  
1Estimates were generated following the methodology outlined by Lakens (2013) through the use of his freeware, available at: https://
sites.google.com/site/lakens2/effect-sizes
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APPENDIX 2: FIGURES 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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APPENDIX C: OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEDURE EMPLOYED TO GENERATE 
A RANDOM DISTRIBUTION OF THE YES AND NO RESPONSES. 
The following example is provided for illustration of what each participant 
might see. 
“Active” is one of the words on the complete list of target words.  All participants will see 
the word “Active” and each participant will asked a question in relation to the word 
“Active.” However, ALL participants will only be asked ONE of the following questions: 
a. Does this word appear in all caps? ACTIVE 
b. Does Lively mean the same as… Active 
c. Does Cerebral mean the same as… Active 
d. Does this word describe you? … Active 
 
To make it possible for the DirectRT program to create an equivalent probability across 
encoding conditions, DirectRT will contain a larger list than what was just indicated. 
The following example is provided for illustration of what DirectRT will “see” for each 
item. 
In the structural condition, a participant could be asked:  
Does this word appear in all caps? ACTIVE  
Does this word appear in all caps? Active 
In the semantic condition, a participant could be asked:  
Does Lively mean the same as… Active 
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Does Cerebral mean the same as… Active 
In the self-reference condition, a participant could be asked:  
Does this word describe you? … Active 
Does this word describe you? … Active 
 
More specifically, the rationale for the additional questions is a) to create a prompt 
intending to elicit a “yes” response and  a “no” response within the structural as well as 
semantic conditions, and b) to create an equal a condition wherein participants have an 
equal likelihood of getting a self-referent question, two identical self-referent questions are 
required. Regarding the likelihood of a “yes” or “no” response within the selfreferent 
condition, as noted above, it is impossible to have experimental control over yes and no 
responses in the self-referent condition, since the person's view dictates the response. 
Additionally, while it is possible to create blocks of items designed to elicit yes or no 
responses, it not feasible to create these blocks; however, scores for the pleasure, valence, 
arousal, and/or likability, and meaningfulness are presented for the items (see Table 5) and 
so it will be possible to examine whether these scores statistically predict item endorsement 
in the self-referent condition or differences in item endorsement based on demographic-
diagnostic characteristics (i.e., borderline features). 
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APPENDIX D: OVERVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS AND PROPOSED GROUP-
FORMATION CRITERIA 
 
The overall goal with the use of the following measures is to assess and record: (a) 
measurable disturbances in identity/self-coherence, from multiple measures, as well as 
(b) elevations on more generalized measures of personality psychopathology, and (c) 
where the generalized measures of personality psychopathology offer both categorical 
and dimensional utility.  The need to record (c) both categorical and dimensional 
measures of generalized personality psychopathology regards the methodological 
refinement of the behavioral indicator of self-coherence under investigation, where 
dimensional measures of both (a) identity/self-coherence and (b) generalized personality 
psychopathology will be utilized in the first stage of developing the indicator.  In stage 
two, categorical measures of functioning will be used to construct discriminant function 
models, where participants’ scores on the proposed indicator will serve as predictors 
with categorical measures of functioning serving as the outcome. 
Categorical Measures of Borderline Symptomatology (i.e., Diagnostic) 
PDQ-BOR. Given the PDQ-BOR provides a measure of the DSM BPD criteria, 
endorsement of at least 5 of the 9 items is considered suggestive of being at-risk for the 
disorder, with fewer than 5 items serving as the location for a diagnostic “cut score.” PAI -
BOR. The BOR scale in isolation has been found to distinguish borderline patients from 
unscreened controls with an 80% hit rate, and successfully identified 91% of these subjects 
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as part of a discriminant function (Bell-Pringle et al., 1997).In line with 
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previous investigations, the current investigation propose a cut-score of 70t for use as part 
of a discriminant function. 
Dimensional Measures of Borderline Symptomatology (i.e., General Personality 
Functioning) 
PDQ-BOR. DSM BPD criteria can aptly be conceptualized as general indicators of 
personality pathology (akin to g in intellectual functioning), an empirical measure of which 
will be provided by a 0-9 (or 0-14, if fully dimensionalizing the impulsivity item) 
dimensional “summed” or “symptom count” of the PDQ-BOR, with higher numbers 
indicating greater levels of overall personality dysfunction. 
PAI-BOR .  The PAI-BOR provides a normed Index of personality functioning, which is 
operationalized as a dimensional “summed” or “item count” of each of the four subscales 
of the PAI-BOR, which include Identity , Negative Affect, Negative Relationships, and 
Self Harm (a measure of impulsivity and disinhibition). Each subscale has 6 items, where 
each item is measured on a 4-point scale, creating a range of 0-24 for each subscale, and 
thus, an overall index of the full subscales would range from 0-96, with higher numbers 
indicating greater levels of overall personality dysfunction, i.e., poor relationships with self 
and others, high negative affect, poor behavioral control.  
Dimensional Measures of Disturbances in Identity/Self-Coherence 
Self-Concept Clarity Scale. The construction of the SCCS was independent of borderline 
symptomatology as well as general psychopathology; moreover, the measure of structural 
disturbance (identity coherence) provided by the SCCS is considered to be 
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theoretically distinct from identity content. The 12-items are rated on 5 point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” and as such, total scores may range 
from 12 to 60, scaled such that scores higher than 30 indicate a dimensional increase in 
pathological self-concept clarity. 
Categorical Measures of Disturbances in Identity/Self-Coherence 
SCCS Problematical Identity. Concerns regarding problematical identity on the 
SCCC will be identified by raw score totals which exceed 36. 
SCCS Non-problematical identity. Non-problematical identity on the SCCC 
will be identified by raw score totals which are below 30. 
PAI-BOR-I Problematical identity (Identity: structural diffusion) will be 
grouped based on scores which exceed 65t (roughly 1.5 standard deviations above 
community participant means and 1SD above the mean for a community sample aged 18-
29 (n=222, M=55.40, SD = 10.99).  Individuals from a college-aged sample, with tscores 
exceeding 65t, can be thought of as having indicators of problematical identity 
functioning (i.e., identity diffusion), at levels which are diagnostically relevant. 
PAI-BOR-I Non-problematical identity (Identity: appropriate structural 
flexibility) will be grouped based on scores ranging from 46-65t (within roughly 1 standard 
deviations of community participant mean scores but within 1SD below the mean for a 
community sample aged 18-29 (n=222, M=55.40, SD = 10.99).  Individuals with tscores 
within the deviation band can be thought of as having identity functioning within normal 
range (i.e., appropriate identity flexibility). 
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***Exploratory*** Measures of Identity Functioning 
(Exploratory) Problematical identity (Identity: excessive structural rigidity)for 
exploratory purposes, in part because of the nature of identity fluctuation as normative for 
a college-aged sample, i.e., college is a time where identity concerns are particularly 
salient and fluctuations on the BOR-I are particularly marked. As such, t scores which are 
indicative of below-average fluctuations in identity begin, conceptually, to move beyond 
being representative of the flexibility of normative identity functioning, where flexibility is 
needed to explore one’s world, confront different possible “selves” and “roles” and 
experience identity crisis—considered essential elements of healthy identity development.  
Below average fluctuations may be suggestive of rigidity of self-structure, which may alter 
the use of the self as a tool for memory, and subsequent findings for the SRE. As such, t 
scores below 45 will be explored as an additional construct of interest, and intend to 
characterize identity functioning which, in contrast to the diffuse and disorganized (high) 
and the normatively flexible (Norm), this group is conceptualized as rigid. 
Additionally, PDQ-BOR captures information regarding identity- specific 
functioning.  Endorsement of at least one of the nine items from the PDQ-BPD is 
considered a marker of problematical identity, namely: Question #32 (“I often wonder 
who I really am”), where previous correlational factor-analytic work (Calvo et al., 2012) 
has suggested that #32 relates most strongly to the DSM-IV identity criterion and that 
together, those two items accounted for 45% (R2=44.89) of the variance in a factor 
described as “Relatedness Disorder.” Additional results from Calvo et al. (2012) suggest 
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that Question #69 (“I feel that my life is dull and meaningless”) related most strongly to the 
DSM-IV emptiness criterion, which as a criterion, is itself thought to be a measure of an 
underlying subjective experience arising from a lack of identity, although notably, previous 
findings have suggested that the emptiness criteria may not be applicable for men (Benson, 
Donnellan, & Morey, 2016; Morey & Benson, 2015), and moreover, there is not a 
sufficient concert of evidence surrounding the use of #69 as a measure of identity, nor 
sufficient evidence to support the standalone use of these two items as a measure of 
identity functioning. Therefore, we propose to investigate the standalone use as well as 
incremental utility of these two items as measures of identity functioning. 
Non-problematical identity on the PDQ-BPD will be explored by the lack of 
endorsement of either question #32 (“I often wonder who I really am”) or question 69 (“I 
feel that my life is dull and meaningless”). 
SCC-scores at 30 and below will be “summed” scored for their ability to increment 
indications of overly rigid identity as part of the exploration on Bor-I T scores below 45.
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APPENDIX E: PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT INVENTORY BORDERLINE 
FEATURES SUBSCALES 
PAI Borderline Features Subscales 
Affective Instability (BOR-A/6) 
14. My mood can shift quite suddenly. 
54. My mood gets quite intense. 
94. My mood is very steady. 
134. I have little control over my anger. 
174. I’ve always been a pretty happy person. 
214. I’ve had times when I was so mad I couldn’t do enough to express 
all my anger. 
 
Identity Problems (BOR-I/6) 
17. My attitude about myself changes a lot. 
57. Sometimes I feel terribly empty inside. 
97. I worry a lot about other people leaving me. 
137. I often wonder what I should do with my life. 
177. I can’t handle separation from those close to me verywell. 
217. I don’t get bored very easily. 
 
Negative Relationships (BOR-N/6) 
19. My relationships have been stormy.  59. I want to let certain 
people know how much they’ve hurt me. 
99. People once close to me have let me down. 
139. I rarely feel very lonely. 179. I’ve made some real mistakes in 
the people I’ve picked as friends. 219. Once someone is my friend, 
we stay friends. 
 
Self-Harm (BOR-S/6) 
143. I sometimes do things so impulsively that I get into trouble. 
183. When I’m upset, I typically do something to hurt myself. 
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223. I’m too impulsive for my own good. 
263. I spend money too easily. 
303. I’m a reckless person.  343. I’m careful 
about how I spend my money. 
 
PDQ-IV (borderline subscale) 
1. 6. I’ll go to extremes to prevent those whom I love from ever leaving me. 
2. 19. I either love someone or hate them, with nothing in between. 
3. 32. I often wonder who I really am 4. 45. I have tried to hurt or kill myself. 
5. 58. I am a very moody person. 
6. 69. I feel that my life is dull and meaningless. 
7. 78. I have difficulty controlling my anger or temper. 
8. 93. When stressed, things happen, like I get paranoid or just “black out.” 
9. 98 +2 I have done things on impulse that could have gotten me into trouble. 
Check the statements that apply to you 
  Spend more money than I have 
  Eating binges 
  Reckless driving 
  Having sex with people I hardly know 
  Drinking too much or 
  Taking drugs 
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APPENDIX F: SLIDES SHOWN TO ORIENT PARTICIPANTS TO THE 
PROCEDURE (DELIVERED VIA THE PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE DIRECT 
RT) 
To warm participants to the procedure, they will be given an overview of the three 
types of questions they will encounter, in the form of the following series of interactive 
images. 
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